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Abstract
Hannan consistency, or no external regret, is a key concept for learning in games. An action selection algorithm
is Hannan consistent (HC) if its performance is eventually as good as selecting the best fixed action in hindsight. If
both players in a zero-sum normal form game use a Hannan consistent algorithm, their average behavior converges to
a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game. A similar result is known about extensive form games, but the played strategies
need to be Hannan consistent with respect to the counterfactual values, which are often difficult to obtain. We study
zero-sum extensive form games with simultaneous moves, but otherwise perfect information. These games generalize
normal form games and they are a special case of extensive form games. We study whether applying HC algorithms
in each decision point of these games directly to the observed payoffs leads to convergence to a Nash equilibrium.
This learning process corresponds to a class of Monte Carlo Tree Search algorithms, which are popular for playing
simultaneous-move games but do not have any known performance guarantees. We show that using HC algorithms
directly on the observed payoffs is not sufficient to guarantee the convergence. With an additional averaging over
joint actions, the convergence is guaranteed, but empirically slower. We further define an additional property of HC
algorithms, which is sufficient to guarantee the convergence without the averaging and we empirically show that
commonly used HC algorithms have this property.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
80
4.
09
04
5v
3 
 [c
s.G
T]
  7
 Ju
l 2
01
9
1 Introduction
Research on learning in games led to multiple algorithmic advancements, such as the variants of the counterfactual
regret minimization algorithm (Zinkevich et al. 2007), which allowed for achieving human performance in poker
(Moravcˇı´k et al. 2017; Brown and Sandholm 2018). Learning in games has been extensively studied in the context of
normal form games, extensive form games, as well as Markov games (Fudenberg et al. 1998; Littman 1994).
One of the key concepts in learning in games is Hannan consistency (Hannan 1957; Hart and Mas-Colell 2000;
Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi 2006), also known as no external regret. An algorithm for repetitively selecting actions from
a fixed set of options is Hannan consistent (HC), if its performance approaches the performance of selecting the best
fixed option all the time. This property was first studied in normal form games known to the players, but it has later
been shown to be achievable also if the algorithm knows only its own choices and the resulting payoffs (Auer et al.
2003).
If both players use a Hannan consistent algorithm in self-play in a zero-sum normal form game, the empirical
frequencies of their action choices converge to a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game1 (Blum and Mansour 2007).
A similar convergence guarantee can be provided for zero-sum imperfect information extensive form games (Zinkevich
et al. 2007). However, it requires the algorithms selecting actions in each decision point to be Hannan consistent with
respect to counterfactual values. Computing these values requires either an expensive traversal of all states in the game
or a sampling scheme with reciprocal weighting (Lanctot et al. 2009) leading to high variance and slower learning
theoretically (Gibson et al. 2012) and in larger games even practically (Bosˇansky´ et al. 2016). Therefore, using them
should be avoided in simpler classes of games, where they are not necessary.
In this paper, we study zero-sum extensive form games with simultaneous moves, but otherwise perfect information
(SMGs). These games generalize normal form games but are a special case of extensive form games. Players in SMGs
simultaneously choose an action to play, after which the game either ends and the players receive a payoff, or the game
continues to a next stage, which is again an SMG. These games are extensively studied in game playing literature (see
Bosˇansky´ et al. 2016 for a survey). They are also closely related to Markov games (Littman 1994), but they do not
allow cycles in the state space and the players always receive a reward only at the end of the game. We study whether
applying HC algorithms in each decision point of an SMG directly to the observed payoffs leads to convergence to
a Nash equilibrium as in normal form games, or whether it is necessary to use additional assumptions about the learning
process.
Convergence properties of Hannan consistent algorithms in simultaneous-move games are interesting also because
using a separate HC algorithm in each decision point directly corresponds to popular variants of Monte Carlo Tree
Search (MCTS) (Coulom 2006; Kocsis and Szepesva´ri 2006) commonly used in SMGs. In SMGs, these algorithms
have been used for playing card games (Teytaud and Flory 2011; Lanctot et al. 2014), variants of simple computer
games (Perick et al. 2012), and in the most successful agents for General Game Playing (Finnsson and Bjo¨rnsson
2008). However, there are no known theoretical guarantees for their performance in this class of games. The main goal
of the paper is to understand better the conditions under which MCTS-like algorithms perform well when applied to
SMGs.
1.1 Contributions
We focus on two player zero-sum extensive form games with simultaneous moves but otherwise perfect information.
We denote a class of algorithms that learn a strategy from a sequence of simulations of self-play in these games as
SM-MCTS. These algorithms use simple selection policies to chose next action to play in each decision point based on
statistics of rewards achieved after individual actions. We study whether Hannan consistency of the selection policies
is sufficient to guarantee convergence of SM-MCTS to a Nash equilibrium of the game. We also investigate whether a
similar relation holds between the approximate versions of Hannan consistency and Nash equilibria.
In Theorem 4.1, we prove a negative result, which is in our opinion the most surprising and interesting part of
the paper, which is the fact that Hannan consistency alone does not guarantee a good performance of the standard
1All of the games discussed in the paper might have multiple Nash equilibria, and regret minimization causes the empirical strategy to approach
the set of these equilibria. For brevity, we will write that a strategy “converges to a NE” to express that there is eventually always some (but not
necessarily always the same) NE close to the strategy.
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SM-MCTS. We present a Hannan consistent selection policy that causes SM-MCTS to converge to a solution far from
the equilibrium.
We show that this could be avoided by a slight modification to SM-MCTS (which we call SM-MCTS-A), which
updates the selection policies by the average reward obtained after a joined action of both players in past simulations,
instead of the result of the current simulation. In Theorem 5.4, we prove that SM-MCTS-A combined with any Hannan
consistent (resp. approximately HC) selection policy with guaranteed exploration converges to a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium (resp. an approximate subgame-perfect NE) in this class of games. For selection policies which are only
approximately HC, we present bounds on the eventual distance from a Nash equilibrium.
In Theorem 5.12, we show that under additional assumptions on the selection policy, even the standard SM-MCTS
can guarantee the convergence. We do this by defining the property of having unbiased payoff observations (UPO),
and showing that it is a sufficient condition for the convergence. We then empirically confirm that the two commonly
used Hannan consistent algorithms, Exp3 and regret matching, satisfy this property, thus justifying their use in practice.
We further investigate the empirical speed of convergence and show that the eventual distance from the equilibrium
is typically much better than the presented theoretical guarantees. We empirically show that SM-MCTS generally
converges as close to the equilibrium as SM-MCTS-A, but does it faster.
Finally, we give theoretical grounds for some practical improvements, which may be used with SM-MCTS, but
have not been formally justified. These include removal of exploration samples from the resulting strategy and the use
of average strategy instead of empirical frequencies of action choices. All presented theoretical results trivially apply
also to perfect information games with sequential moves. The counterexample in Theorem 4.1, on the other hand,
applies to Markov and general extensive form games.
1.2 Article outline
In Section 2 we describe simultaneous-move games, the standard class of SM-MCTS algorithms, and our modification
SM-MCTS-A. We then describe the multi-armed bandit problem, the definition of Hannan consistency, and explain
two of the common Hannan consistent bandit algorithms (Exp3 and regret matching). We also explain the relation
of the studied problem with counterfactual regret minimization, multi-agent reinforcement learning, and shortest path
problems.
In Section 3, we explain the relation of SM-MCTS setting with the multi-armed bandit problem. In this section, we
also define the technical notation which is used in the proofs of our main results.
In Section 4, we provide a counterexample showing that for general Hannan consistent algorithms, SM-MCTS does
not necessarily converge. While interesting in itself, this result also hints at which modifications are sufficient to get
convergence. The positive theoretical results are presented in Section 5. First, we consider the modified SM-MCTS-
A and present the asymptotic bound on its convergence rate. We follow by defining the unbiased payoff observations
property and proving the convergence of SM-MCTS based on HC selection policies with this property. We then present
an example which gives a lower bound on the quality of a strategy to which SM-MCTS(-A) converges.
In Section 6, we make a few remarks about which strategy should be considered as the output of SM-MCTS(-
A). In Section 7, we present an empirical investigation of convergence of SM-MCTS and SM-MCTS-A, as well as
empirical evidence supporting that the commonly used HC-algorithms guarantee the UPO property. Finally, Section 8
summarizes the results and highlights open questions which might be interesting for future research. Table 2 then
recapitulates the notation and abbreviations used throughout the paper.
2 Background
We now introduce the game theory fundamentals and notation used throughout the paper. We define simultaneous-
move games, describe the class of SM-MCTS algorithms and its modification SM-MCTS-A, and afterward, we discuss
existing selection policies and their properties.
3
2.1 Simultaneous move games
A finite two-player zero-sum game with perfect information and simultaneous moves can be described by a tuple
G = (H ,Z ,A ,T ,u,h0), where H is a set of inner states and Z denotes the terminal states2. A = A1×A2 is
the set of joint actions of individual players and we denote A1(h) = {1, . . . ,mh} and A2(h) = {1, . . . ,nh} the actions
available to individual players in state h ∈H . The game begins in an initial state h0. The transition function T :
H ×A1×A2 7→H ∪Z defines the successor state given a current state and actions for both players. For brevity,
we denote T (h, i, j)≡ hi j. We assume that all the sets are finite and that the whole setting is modeled as a tree.3 The
payoffs of player 1 and 2 are defined by the utility function u= (u1,u2) :Z → [0,1]2. We assume constant-sum games
(which are equivalent to zero-sum games): ∀z ∈Z ,u2(z) = 1−u1(z).
A matrix game is a special case of the setting above, where G only has a single stage, h – we have H = {h}.
In this case we can simplify the notation and represent the game by the matrix M = (vMi j )i, j ∈ [0,1]m×n, where for
(i, j)∈A1×A2 = {1, . . . ,m}×{1, . . . ,n}, we have u1(hi j) = vMi j . In other words, vMi j corresponds to the payoff received
by player 1 if player 1 chooses the row i and player 2 chooses the column j. A strategy σp ∈ ∆(Ap) is a distribution
over the actions inAp. If σ1 is represented as a row vector and σ2 as a column vector, then the expected value to player
1 when both players play with these strategies is u1(σ1,σ2) = σ1Mσ2. Given a profile σ = (σ1,σ2), define the utilities
against best response strategies to be u1(br,σ2)=maxσ ′1∈∆(A1)σ
′
1Mσ2 and u1(σ1,br)=minσ ′2∈∆(A2)σ1Mσ
′
2. A strategy
profile (σ1,σ2) is an ε-Nash equilibrium of the matrix game M if and only if
u1(br,σ2)−u1(σ1,σ2)≤ ε and u1(σ1,σ2)−u1(σ1,br)≤ ε (2.1)
A behavioral strategy for player p is a mapping from states h ∈H to a probability distribution over the actions
Ap(h), denoted σp(h). Given a profile σ = (σ1,σ2), define the probability of reaching a terminal state z under σ as
piσ (z) = piσ1 (z)pi
σ
2 (z), where each pi
σ
p (z) is a product of probabilities of the actions taken by player p along the path to
z. Define Σp to be the set of behavioral strategies for player p. Then for any strategy profile σ = (σ1,σ2) ∈ Σ1×Σ2 we
define the expected utility of the strategy profile (for player 1) as
u(σ) = u(σ1,σ2) =∑
z
piσ (z)u1(z) (2.2)
An ε-Nash equilibrium profile (σ1,σ2) in this case is defined analogously to (2.1). In other words, none of the players
can improve their utility by more than ε by deviating unilaterally. If σ = (σ1,σ2) is an exact Nash equilibrium (an ε-
NE with ε = 0), then we denote the unique value of G as vG = vh0 = u(σ1,σ2) = minσ ′2 maxσ ′1 u(σ
′
1,σ
′
2) (because of
the last identity, NE in this setting could also be called “minimax optima”).
A subgame rooted in state h ∈H is the game (N ,H ,Z ,A ,T ,u,h). This is the same game as the original one,
except that it starts at the node h instead of h0. We denote by vh the value of this subgame. An ε-Nash equilibrium
profile σ is called subgame-perfect if σ is ε-Nash equilibrium of the subgame rooted at h for every h ∈H (even at
the nodes which are unreachable under this strategy).
Two-player perfect information games with simultaneous moves are sometimes appropriately called stacked matrix
games because at every state h there is a joint action set A1(h)×A2(h) where each joint action (i, j) either leads to
a terminal state with utility u1(hi j) or to a subgame rooted in hi j. This subgame is itself another stacked matrix game
and its unique value vhi j can be determined by backward induction (see Figure 1). Thus finding the optimal strategy at
h is the same as finding the optimal strategy in the matrix game (vhi j)i, j, where v
h
i j is either u1(hi j) or v
hi j .
2.2 Simultaneous Move Monte Carlo Tree Search
Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) is a simulation-based state space search algorithm often used in game trees. The
main idea is to iteratively run simulations from the current state h0 until the end of the game, incrementally growing
a tree T⊂H ∪Z rooted at the current state. In the basic form of the algorithm, T only contains h0 and a single leaf
2In our analysis, we will assume that the game does not contain chance nodes, where the next node is randomly selected by ”nature” according
to some probability distribution. We do this purely to reduce the amount of technical notation required – as long as the state-space is finite, all of
the results hold even if the chance nodes are present. This can be proven in a straightforward way.
3That is, if (h, i, j) 6= (h′, i′, j′) then hi j 6= hi′ j′ .
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Figure 1: Example game tree of a game with perfect information and simultaneous moves. Only the leaves contain
actual rewards – the values in the inner nodes are achieved by optimal play in the corresponding subtree, they are not
part of the definition of the game.
is added each iteration. Each iteration starts at h0. If MCTS encounters a node h ∈ T whose all children in H ∪Z
are already in T, it uses the statistics maintained at h to select one of its children that it then transitions to. If MCTS
encounters a node h ∈ T that has children that aren’t yet in T, it adds one of them to T and transitions to it. Then
we apply a rollout policy (for example, a random action selection) from this new leaf of T to some terminal state of
the game. The outcome of the simulation is then returned as a reward to the new leaf and all its predecessors.
In Simultaneous Move MCTS (SM-MCTS), the main difference is that a joint action of both players is selected
and used to transition to a following state. The algorithm has been previously applied, for example in the game
of Tron (Perick et al. 2012), Urban Rivals (Teytaud and Flory 2011), and in general game-playing (Finnsson and
Bjo¨rnsson 2008). However, guarantees of convergence to a NE remain unknown, and Shafiei et al. (2009) show that
the most popular selection policy (UCB) does not converge to a NE, even in a simple one-stage game. The convergence
to a NE depends critically on the selection and update policies applied. We describe variants of two popular selection
algorithms in Section 2.3.
Description of SM-MCTS algorithm
In Algorithm 1, we present a generic template of MCTS algorithms for simultaneous-move games (SM-MCTS). We
then proceed to explain how specific algorithms are derived from this template.
Algorithm 1 describes a single iteration of SM-MCTS. T represents the incrementally built MCTS tree, in which
each state is represented by one node. Every node h ∈ T maintains algorithm-specific statistics about the iterations that
previously used this node. In the terminal states, the algorithm returns the value of the state for the first player (line 2).
If the current state has a node in the current MCTS tree T, the statistics in the node are used to select an action for
each player (line 4). These actions are executed (line 5) and the algorithm is called recursively on the resulting state
(line 6). The result of this call is used to update the statistics maintained for state h (line 7). If the current state is not
stored in tree T, it is added to the tree (line 10) and its value is estimated using the rollout policy (line 11). The rollout
policy is usually uniform random action selection until the game reaches a terminal state, but it can also be based on
domain-specific knowledge. Finally, the result of the Rollout is returned to higher levels of the tree.
The template can be instantiated by specific implementations of the updates of the statistics on line 7 and the se-
lection based on these statistics on line 4. Selection policies can be based on many different algorithms, but the most
successful ones use algorithms for solving the multi-armed bandit problem introduced in Section 2.3. Specifically, we
firstly decide on an algorithm A and choose all of its parameters except for the number of available actions. Then we
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run a separate instance of this algorithm for each node h ∈ T and each of the players. In each node, the action for each
player is selected based only on the history. The update procedure then uses the values u1(h) and and 1− u1(h) to
update the statistics of player 1 and 2 at h respectively (this way, both the values are in the interval [0,1]).
This work assumes that, except for the SM-MCTS back-propagation, the selection algorithms do not communicate
with each other in any way. We refrain from analyzing the (potentially more powerful) algorithms which have access
to non-local variables (e.g. a global clock, abstraction-based information sharing) because such analysis would be
significantly more complicated, but also because the primary goal of this paper is to understand the limits of the
simpler selection policies.
SM-MCTS-A algorithm
We also propose an “averaged” variant of the algorithm, which we denote as SM-MCTS-A (see Algorithm 2). Its
main advantage over SM-MCTS is that it guarantees convergence to a NE under much weaker conditions (Theorem
5.4). Focusing on the differences between these algorithms helps us better understand what is missing to guarantee
convergence of SM-MCTS.
SM-MCTS-A works similarly to SM-MCTS, except that during the back-propagation phase, every visited node
h ∈ T sends back to its parent the average reward obtained from h so far (denoted Gh/th). The parent is then updated
by this “averaged” reward Gh/th, rather than by the current reward x (line 7). In practice, this is achieved by doing a
bit of extra book-keeping — storing the cumulative reward Gh and the number of visits th and updating them during
each visit of h (lines 5 and 8) and back-propagating both the current and average rewards (line 9).
We note that in our previous work (Lisy´ et al. 2013) we prove a result similar to Theorem 5.4 here. However,
the algorithm that we used earlier is different from SM-MCTS-A algorithm described here. In particular, SM-MCTS-
A uses averaged values for decision making in each node but propagates backward the non-averaged values (unlike
the previous version, which also updates the selection algorithm based on the averaged values, but then it propagates
backward these averaged numbers – and on the next level, it takes averages of averages and so on). Consequently, this
new version is much closer to the non-averaged SM-MCTS used in practice, and it has faster empirical convergence.
2.3 Multi-armed bandit problem
The multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem is one of the basic models in online learning. It often serves as the basic
model for studying fundamental trade-offs between exploration and exploitation in an unknown environment (Auer
et al. 1995, 2002). In practical applications, the algorithms developed for this model have recently been used in online
advertising (Pandey et al. 2007), convex optimization (Flaxman et al. 2005), and, most importantly for this paper, in
Monte Carlo tree search algorithms (Kocsis and Szepesva´ri 2006; Browne et al. 2012; Gelly and Silver 2011; Teytaud
SM-MCTS(h – current state of the game)
1: if h ∈Z then // current state is terminal
2: return u1(h)
3: if h ∈ T then // current state is in memory
4: (i, j)← Select(h)
5: h′← hi j // get the next game state
6: x← SM-MCTS(h′)
7: Update(h, i, j,x)
8: return x
9: else // state is not in memory
10: T← T∪{h} // add state to memory
11: x← Rollout(h) // finish the game randomly
12: return x
Alg. 1: Simultaneous Move Monte Carlo Tree Search
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and Flory 2011; Coulom 2007). More details can be found in an extensive survey of the field by Bubeck and Cesa-
Bianchi (2012).
Definition 2.1 (Adversarial multi-armed bandit problem). Multi-armed bandit problem is specified by a set of actions
{1, . . . ,K} and a sequence of reward vectors x(1),x(2), . . . , where x(t) = (xi(t))Ki=1 ∈ [0,1]K for each t ∈ N. In each
time step, an agent selects an action i(t) and receives the payoff xi(t)(t).
Note that the agent does not observe the values xi(t) for i 6= i(t). There are many special cases and generalizations
of this setting (such as the stochastic bandit problem), however, in this paper, we only need the following variant of
this concept:
The (adaptive) adversarial MAB problem (P) is identical to the setting above, except that each xi(t+1) is a random
variable that might depend on x(1), . . . ,x(t) and i(1), . . . , i(t).
A bandit algorithm is any procedure which takes as an input the number K ∈N, the sequence of actions i(1), ..., i(t)
played thus far and the rewards received as a result and returns the next action i(t+1) ∈ {1, ...,K} to be played.
Bandit algorithms usually attempt to optimize their behavior with respect to some notion of regret. Intuitively,
their goal is the minimization of the difference between playing the strategy given by the algorithm and playing some
baseline strategy, which can use information not available to the agent. For example, the most common notion of regret
is the external regret, which is the difference between playing according to the prescribed strategy and playing the fixed
optimal action all the time.
Definition 2.2 (External Regret). The external regret for playing a sequence of actions i(1), i(2), . . . , i(t) in (P) is
defined as
R(t) = max
i=1,...,K
t
∑
s=1
xi(s)−
t
∑
s=1
xi(s)(s).
By r(t) we denote the average external regret r(t) := 1t R(t).
2.4 Hannan consistent algorithms
A desirable goal for any bandit algorithm is the classical notion of Hannan consistency. Having this property means
that for high enough t, the algorithm performs nearly as well as it would if it played the optimal constant action since
the beginning.
Definition 2.3 (Hannan consistency). An algorithm is ε-Hannan consistent for some ε ≥ 0 if limsupt→∞ r(t) ≤ ε
holds with probability 1, where the “probability” is understood with respect to the randomization of the algorithm.
An algorithm is Hannan consistent if it is 0-Hannan consistent.
We now present regret matching and Exp3, two of the ε-Hannan consistent algorithms previously used in MCTS.
The proofs of Hannan consistency of variants of these two algorithms, as well as more related results, can be found
in a survey by Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006, Section 6). The fact that the variants presented here are ε-HC is not
explicitly stated there, but it immediately follows from the last inequality in the proof of Theorem 6.6 in the survey.
2.4.1 Exponential-weight algorithm for Exploration and Exploitation
The most popular algorithm for minimizing regret in adversarial bandit setting is the Exponential-weight algorithm
for Exploration and Exploitation (Exp3) proposed by Auer et al. (2003), further improved by Stoltz (2005) and then
yet further by Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi (2012, Sec. 3). The algorithm has many different variants for various modifi-
cations of the setting and desired properties. We present a formulation of the algorithm based on the original version
in Algorithm 3.
Exp3 stores the estimates of the cumulative reward of each action over all iterations, even those in which the action
was not selected. In the pseudo-code in Algorithm 3, we denote this value for action i by Gi. It is initially set to 0
on line 1. In each iteration, a probability distribution µ is created proportionally to the exponential of these estimates.
The distribution is combined with a uniform distribution with probability γ to ensure sufficient exploration of all actions
(line 4). After an action is selected and the reward is received, the estimate for the performed action is updated using
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importance sampling (line 6): the reward is weighted by one over the probability of using the action. As a result,
the expected value of the cumulative reward estimated only from the time steps where the agent selected the action is
the same as the actual cumulative reward over all the time steps.
In practice, the optimal choice of the exploration parameter γ strongly depends on the computation time available
for each decision and the specific domain (Tak et al. 2014). However, the amount of exploration γ directly translates to
γ-Hannan consistency of the algorithm. We later show that, asymptotically, smaller γ yields smaller worst-case error
when the algorithm is used in SM-MCTS.
2.4.2 Regret matching
An alternative learning algorithm that allows minimizing regret in adversarial bandit setting is regret matching (Hart
and Mas-Colell 2001), later generalized as polynomially weighted average forecaster (Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi 2006).
Regret matching (RM) corresponds to selection of the parameter p = 2 in the more general formulation. It is a general
procedure originally developed for playing known general-sum matrix games in Hart and Mas-Colell (2000). The al-
gorithm computes, for each action in each step, the regret for not playing another fixed action every time the action has
been played in the past. The action to be played in the next round is selected randomly with probability proportional
to the positive portion of the regret for not playing the action.
The average strategy4 resulting from this procedure has been shown to converge to the set of coarse correlated
equilibria in general-sum games. As a result, it converges to a Nash equilibrium in a zero-sum game. The regret
matching procedure in Hart and Mas-Colell (2000) requires the exact information about all utility values in the game,
as well as the action selected by the opponent in each step. In Hart and Mas-Colell (2001), the authors modify the regret
matching procedure and relax these requirements. Instead of computing the exact values for the regrets, the regrets are
estimated in a similar way as the cumulative rewards in Exp3. As a result, the modified regret matching procedure is
applicable to the MAB problem.
We present the algorithm in Algorithm 4. The algorithm stores the estimates of the regrets for not playing action i
in all time steps in the past in variables Ri. On lines 3-7, it computes the strategy for the current time step. If there is
no positive regret for any action, a uniform strategy is used (line 5). Otherwise, the strategy is chosen proportionally
to the positive part of the regrets (line 7). The uniform exploration with probability γ is added to the strategy as in
the case of Exp3. It also ensures that the addition on line 10 is bounded.
Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006) prove that regret matching eventually achieves zero regret in the adversarial MAB
problem, but they provide the exact finite time bound only for the perfect-information case, where the agent learns
rewards of all arms.
2.5 An Alternative to SM-MCTS: Counterfactual Regret Minimization
Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is an iterative algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria in zero-
sum extensive-form games with imperfect information (EFGs). Since we use EFGs only at a few places, we overload
the defined notation with corresponding concepts form EFGs. In the EFG setting, the elements of H are typically
called histories rather than states. Unlike in SMGs, each non-terminal history h ∈H only has a single acting player.
The second difference is that in EFGs, histories are partitioned into information sets. Instead of observing the current
history h directly, the acting player only sees the information set I that h belongs to. The EFG framework is more
general than the SMG one since each simultaneous decision in an SMG can be modeled by two consecutive decisions
in an EFG (where the player who acts second does not know the action chosen by the first player).
Let σ be the strategy profile of the players and denote piσ (h) the probability of reaching h ∈H from the root of
the game under the strategy profile σ , piσ (h,z) the probability of reaching history z given the game has already reached
history h. We use the lower index at pi to denote the players who contribute to the probability, i.e., piσp (h) is player
p’s contribution5 to the probability of reaching h and piσ−p(h) is the contribution of the opponent of p and chance if it
is present, i.e., piσ (h) = piσp (h) ·piσ−p(h). We further denote by ha the history reached after playing action a in history
h. The counterfactual value of player p playing action a in an information set I under a strategy σ is the expected
4The average strategy is defined as µ¯(t) := 1t ∑
t
s=1 µ(s), where µ(s) is the strategy used at iteration s.
5It is the product of the probabilities of the actions executed by player p in history h.
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reward obtained when player p first chooses the actions to reach I, plays action a, and then plays based on σp, while
the opponent and chance play according to σ−p all the time:
vσp (I,a) = ∑
(h,z)∈ZI
piσ−p(h)pi
σ (ha,z)up(z),
where ZI = {(h,z)|z ∈Z ,h ∈ I,h is prefix of z} are the terminal histories that visit information set I by a prefix h.
Counterfactual regret in an information set is the external regret (see Definition 2.2) with respect to the counter-
factual values. Counterfactual regret minimization algorithms minimize counterfactual regret in each information set,
which provably leads to convergence of average strategies to a Nash equilibrium of the EFG (Zinkevich et al. 2007).
The variant of counterfactual regret minimization most relevant for this paper is Monte Carlo Counterfactual Regret
Minimization (MCCFR) and more specifically outcome sampling. MCCFR minimizes the counterfactual regrets by
minimizing their unbiased estimates obtained by sampling. In the case of outcome sampling, these estimates are com-
puted based on sampling a single terminal history, as in MCTS. Let q(z) be the probability of sampling a history z.
The sampled counterfactual value is:
v˜σp (I,a) =
{ 1
q(z)pi
σ−p(h)piσ (ha,z)up(z) if (h,z) ∈ ZI
0 otherwise.
The sampling probability typically decreases exponentially with the depth of the tree. Therefore, 1q(z) will often be
large, which causes high variance in sampled counterfactual value. This has been shown to cause slower convergence
both theoretically (Gibson et al. 2012) and practically (Bosˇansky´ et al. 2016).
2.6 Relation to Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning
Our work is also related to multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) in Markov games (Littman 1994). The goal of
reinforcement learning is to converge to the optimal policy based on rewards obtained in simulations. Markov games
are more general than SMGs in allowing immediate rewards and cycles in the state space. However, any SMG can be
viewed as a Markov game. Therefore, the negative results presented in this paper apply to Markov games as well.
To the best of our knowledge, the existing algorithms in MARL literature do not help with answering the question of
convergence of separate Hannan consistent strategies in individual decision points. They either explicitly approximate
and solve the matrix games for individual stages of the Markov games (e.g., Littman 1994) or do not have convergence
guarantees beyond repeated matrix games (Bowling and Veloso 2002).
2.7 Relation to Stochastic Shortest Path Problem
Recently, some authors considered variants of Markov decision processes (MDP, see for example Puterman 2014),
where the rewards may change over time (stochastic shortest path problem, discussed for example in Neu et al. 2010)
or even more generally, where the rewards and the transition probabilities may change over time (Yu and Mannor 2009;
Abbasi et al. 2013).
SM-MCTS can be viewed as a special case of this scenario, where the transition probabilities change over time,
but the rewards remain the same. Indeed, assuming the role of one of the players, we can view each node of the game
tree as a state in MDP. From a state h, we can visit its child nodes with a probability which depends on the strategy of
the other player. This strategy is unknown to the first player and will change over time.
Our setting is more specific than the general version of MDP – the state space contains no loops, as it is, in
fact, a tree. Moreover, the rewards are only received at the terminal states and correspond to the value of these
states. Consequently, an algorithm which would perform well in this special case of MDPs with variable transition
probabilities could also be successfully used for solving simultaneous-move games. However, to the best of our
knowledge, so far all such algorithms require additional assumptions, which do not hold in our case.
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3 Application of the MAB Problem to SM-MCTS(-A)
To analyze SM-MCTS(-A) we need to know how it is affected by the selection policies it uses (line 4 in Algorithms
1 and 2) and by the properties of the game it is applied to. In this section, we first introduce some additional notation
related to the MAB problem and SM-MCTS(-A). We then frame the events at h as a separate MAB problem (Ph)
(resp. (P¯h) for SM-MCTS-A) in such a way that applying the bandit algorithm from h to (Ph) yields exactly the output
observed at line 4.
Throughout the paper we will use the following notation for quantities related to MAB problems: In any MAB
problem (P), the reward assignment xi(t) is such that
xi(t) = the reward the agent would receive in (P) if they chose the action i at time t. (3.1)
We define the notions of cumulative payoff G(·) and maximum cumulative payoff Gmax(·) and relate these quantities
to the external regret6:
G(t) :=
t
∑
s=1
xi(s)(s)
Gmax(t) := max
i∈A1
t
∑
s=1
xi(s), (3.2)
R(t) = Gmax(t)−G(t).
We also define the corresponding average notions and relate them to the average regret:
g(t) := G(t)/t,
gmax(t) := Gmax(t)/t,
r(t) = gmax(t)−g(t).
(3.3)
Next, we introduce the additional notation related to SM-MCTS(-A). By ih(t) and jh(t)we denote the action chosen
by player 1 (resp. 2) during the t-th visit of h. To track the number of uses of each action, we set 7
thi := 1+
∣∣∣{1≤ s≤ t−1| ih(s) = i}∣∣∣ ,
thi j := 1+
∣∣∣{1≤ s≤ t−1| ih(s) = i & jh(s) = j}∣∣∣ (3.4)
and define thj analogously to t
h
i . Note that when (i, j) = (i
h(t), jh(t)), thi j is actually equal to the number of times this
joint action has been used up to (and including) the t-th iteration. For (i, j) 6= (ih(t), jh(t)), this is equal to the same
number increased by 1.
We now define (Ph). When referring to the quantities from (3.2) and (3.3) which correspond to (Ph), we will add
the superscript h (for example Ghmax, g
h, rh). To keep the different levels of indices manageable, we will sometimes
write e.g. ghi j and x
h
i j instead of g
hi j and xhi j . To indicate whether an average regret is related to player 1 or 2, we denote
the corresponding quantities as rh1 and r
h
2.
Since we want the reward assignment corresponding to (Ph) to coincide with what is happening at h during SM-
MCTS(-A), (3.1) requires us to define xhi (t) as
xhi (t) := the reward x from line 6 in Figure 1 (resp. 2) that we would get
during the t-th visit of h if we switched the first action at line 4
to i (while keeping the choice of player 2 as j = jh(t)). (3.5)
6For definition of the external regret, see Definition 2.2.
7Note that we define thi as the number of uses of i up to the (t− 1)-th visit of h, increased by 1, even though the more natural candidate would
be simply the number of uses of i up to the t-th visit. However, this version will simplify the notation later and for the purposes of computing
the empirical frequencies, the difference between the two definitions becomes negligible with increasing t.
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In particular, the reward for the selected action i = ih(t) is
xh(t) = xhih(t)(t) = the reward obtained during the t-th visit of h. (3.6)
For i 6= ih(t), the unobserved reward xhi (t) corresponds the value we would receive if we ran SM-MCTS(-A)(hi jh(t))
during the t-th visit of h. Before the t-th visit of h, its child hi jh(t) has been visited (t
h
i jh(t)−1)-times. The hypothetical
visit from (3.5) would therefore be the thi jh(t)-th one, implying that
xhi (t) = x
h
i jh(t)(t
h
i jh(t)). (3.7)
We note a property of xhi (t) that obviously follows from either (3.5) or (3.7), but might be unintuitive and is crucial
for understanding the behavior of SM-MCTS(-A). Consider an action i 6= ih(t) that has not been selected at time t.
Then, assuming the opponent keeps playing jh(t), the random variable xhi (t) will not change until player 1 selects i
and thi jh(t) increases. (Because nodes that do not get visited remain inactive and none of their variables change.) This
setting where rewards come from “reward pools” and stay around until they get “used up” is in a direct contrast with
the non-adaptive MAB setting where even the non-selected rewards disappear. However, we argue that this behavior
is inherent to the presented version of SM-MCTS(-A), and might cause its non-averaged variant to malfunction (as
demonstrated in Section 4).
The MAB problem (P¯h) is defined analogously to (Ph), except that we denote the rewards as x¯hi (t) instead of
xhi (t), and define x¯
h
i (t) as the number x¯ (rather than x) from line 6 from Algorithm 2. This x¯ is, by definition, equal to
the average reward ghi j(·) from the corresponding child node. It follows that x¯hi (t) coincides with ghi jh(t)(thi jh(t)) (more
precisely, ghi jh(t)(t
h
i jh(t)) is a realization of the random variable x¯
h
i (t) ).
Lastly, we define the empirical and average strategies corresponding to a specific run of SM-MCTS(-A). By th(T )
we denote the number of visits of h up to the T -th iteration of SM-MCTS(-A). By empirical frequencies we mean
the strategy profile σˆ(T ) = (σˆhp(th(T )))p=1,2, h∈H defined as σˆh1 (t)(i) := t
h
i /t (resp. t j/t for player 2). The average
strategy σ¯(T ) is defined analogously, with
σ¯hp(t)(i) :=
1
t
t
∑
s=1
σhp(s)(i) (3.8)
in place of σˆhp(t)(i). The following lemma says the two strategies can be used interchangeably. The proof consists of
an application of the strong law of large numbers and can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 3.1. In the limit, the empirical frequencies and average strategies will almost surely be equal. That is,
limsupt→∞maxi∈A1 |σˆ1(t)(i)− σ¯1(t)(i)|= 0 holds with probability 1.
4 Insufficiency of Local Regret Minimization for Global Convergence
One might hope that any HC selection policy in SM-MCTS would guarantee that the average strategy converges to
a NE. Unfortunately, this is not the case – the goal of this section is to present a corresponding counterexample.
The behavior of the counterexample is summarized by the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1. There exists a simultaneous-move zero-sum game G with perfect information and a HC algorithm A,
such that when A is used as a selection policy for SM-MCTS, then the average strategy σ¯ (t) almost surely converges
outside of the set of 15 -Nash equilibria.
How is such a pathological behavior possible? Essentially, it is because the sampling in SM-MCTS is closely
related to the observed payoffs. By synchronizing the sampling algorithms in different nodes in a particular way, we
will introduce a bias to the payoff observations. This will make the optimal strategy look worse than it actually is,
leading the players to adopt a different strategy.
Note that the algorithm from Theorem 4.1 does have the guaranteed exploration property defined in Section 5,
which rules out some trivial counterexamples where parts of the game tree are never visited.
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4.1 Simplifying remarks
We present two observations regarding the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Firstly, instead of a HC algorithm, it is enough to construct an ε-HC algorithm Aε with the prescribed behavior for
arbitrary ε > 0. The desired 0-HC algorithm can then be constructed in a standard way – that is, by using a 1-Hannan
consistent algorithm A1 for some period t1, then a 12 -HC algorithm A1/2 for a longer period t2 and so on. By choosing
a sequence (tn)n, which increases quickly enough, we can guarantee that the resulting combination of algorithms
(
A1/n
)
is 0-Hannan consistent.
Furthermore, we can assume without loss of generality that the algorithm A knows if it is playing as the first
or the second player and that in each node of the game, we can actually use a different algorithm A. This is true
because the algorithm always accepts the number of available actions as input. Therefore we could define the algorithm
differently based on this number, and modify our game in some trivial way which would not affect our example (such
as duplicating rows or columns).
4.2 The counterexample
The structure of the proof of Theorem 4.1 is now as follows. First, we introduce the game G (Figure 2) and a sequence
of joint actions in G which leads to
∑
h∈H
rh1(t
h(T )) = ∑
h∈H
rh2(t
h(T )) = 0 & u1(σ¯(T ))≤ vG− 14 .
This behavior will serve as a basis for our counterexample. However, the “algorithms” generating this sequence of
actions will be oblivious to the actions of the opponent, which means that they will not be ε-HC. In the second step
of our proof (Lemma 4.2), we modify these algorithms in such a way that the resulting sequence of joint actions stays
similar to the original sequence, but the new algorithms are ε-HC. In combination with the simplifying remarks from
Section 4.1, this gives Theorem 4.1.
4.2.1 Deterministic version of the counterexample
Let G be the game from Figure 2. First, we will note what the Nash equilibrium strategy pi in G looks like. Having
done that, we will describe a sequence of actions in G which leads to a different (non-NE) strategy σ¯ . We will then
analyze the properties of this sequence, showing that utility of σ¯ is sub-optimal, even though the regrets rhp for every
h ∈ H = {I,J} will be equal to zero. The counter-intuitive part of the example is the fact that this pathological
sequence satisfies rI1 = 0.
When it comes to the optimal solution of G, we see that J is the well known game of matching pennies. The equi-
librium strategy in J is piJ1 = pi
J
2 =
( 1
2 ,
1
2
)
and the value of this subgame is vJ = 12 . Consequently, player 1 always wants
to play Y at I, meaning that the NE strategy at I is pi I1 = (0,1) and the value of the whole game is v
G = 12 .
We define the “pathological” action sequence as follows. Let h ∈ I,J and t ∈ N. We set8(
iI(1), iI(2), . . .
)
= (Y,X ,X ,Y, Y,X ,X ,Y, . . .) ,((
iJ(1), jJ(1)
)
,
(
iJ(2), jJ(2)
)
, . . .
)
= ((U,L),(U,R),(D,R),(D,L), . . .) ,
where the dots mean that both sequences are 4-periodic. The resulting average strategy converges to σ¯ , where σ¯ I =
σ¯ J1 = σ¯
J
2 =
( 1
2 ,
1
2
)
.
We now calculate the observed rewards which correspond to the behavior described above. We will use the notation
from Section 3 to describe the events at I and J as MAB problems (PI) and (PJ). The action sequence at J is defined
in such a way that we have (
xJ (1) ,xJ (2) , . . .
)
= (1,0,1,0, . . .) . (4.1)
8Recall that ih(t) and jh(t) are the actions of player 1 and 2 in t-th visit of a node h.
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Player 1 (node I)
0
X
Player 1 (node J)
1
L
0
R
U
0
L
1
R
D
Y
Player 2 (node J)
Figure 2: Example of a game in which it is possible to minimize regret at each of the nodes while producing highly
sub-optimal average strategy. The extensive form representation of the game is on the left side, the SMG representation
is on the right side. Since the game is zero-sum, only the utilities for Player 1 are displayed.
At the root I of G, we clearly have xIX (t) = 0 for all t ∈ N. Since for t = 2,3,6,7,10,11, . . . we have iI(t) = X ,
the rewards received at I during these iterations will be xI(t) = 0. Combining this with (4.1), we see that the rewards
received at I are (
xI(1),xI(2), . . .
)
=
(
xJ(1),0,0,xJ(2),xJ(3),0,0,xJ(4), . . .
)
= (1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0, . . .) .
(4.2)
In particular, the average reward in G converges to the above mentioned 14 .
We claim that the limit average strategy σ¯ is far from being optimal. Indeed, as we observed earlier, the average
payoff at I converges to 14 , which is strictly less than the game value v
G = 12 . Clearly, player 1 is playing sub-optimally
by achieving only u1(σ¯) = 14 . By changing their action sequence at I to (Y,Y,Y, . . .), they increase their utility to
1
2 .
However, none of the players observes any local regret. First, we check that no regret is observed at J. We see that
the average payoff from J converges to 12 . In the node J, each player takes each action exactly
9 half the time. Since we
are in the matching pennies game, this means that neither of the players can improve their payoff at J by changing all
their actions to any single action. Thus for both players p = 1,2, we have rJp(t) = 0.
Next, we prove that player 1 observes no regret at I. We start by giving an intuitive explanation of why this is so.
When computing regret, the player compares the rewards they received by playing as they did with the rewards they
would receive if they changed their actions to Y,Y, . . . . If, at time t = 1, they asks themselves: “What would I receive if
I played Y ?”, the answer is “1”. They do play Y , and so the strategy in J changes and when they next asks themselves
the same question at time t = 2, the answer is “0”. However this time, they do not play Y until t = 4, and so the answer
remains “0” for t = 3 and t = 4. Only at t = 5 does the answer change to “1” and the whole process repeats. This way,
they is “tricked” into thinking that the average reward coming from J is 1+0+0+04 =
1
4 , rather than
1
2 .
To formalize the above idea, we use the notation introduced in Section 3. In order to get rI1(t)→ 0, it suffices to
show that for t = 4k, the 1t ∑
t
s=1 x
I
Y (s) =
1
4 . Since the whole pattern is clearly 4-periodic, this reduces to showing that
xIY (1)+ x
I
Y (2)+ x
I
Y (3)+ x
I
Y (4) = 1+0+0+0 = 1.
Since for t = 1, the action Y actually got chosen, we have Y = iI(1) and
xIY (1) = x
I
iI(1)(1)
def.
= xI(1)
(4.1)
= 1.
9To be precise, the ratio is exactly 50% for iterations divisible by 4, and slightly different for the rest.
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The same argument yields xIY (4) = 0. For t = 2 and t = 3, the first iteration s satisfying s≥ t and iI(s) =Y is s = 4. By
definition in (3.6), it follows that both xIY (2) and x
I
Y (3) are equal to x
I(4), which is zero by (4.2).
4.2.2 Hannan consistent version of the counterexample
The following lemma states that the (deterministic) algorithms of player 1 and 2 described in Section 4.2.1 can be
modified into ε-Hannan consistent algorithms in such a way that when facing each other, their behavior remains similar
to the original algorithms.
Lemma 4.2. Let G be the game from Figure 2. Then for each ε > 0 there exist ε-HC algorithms AI , AJ1, A
J
2, such
that when these algorithms are used for SM-MCTS in G, the resulting average strategy σ¯ (t) converges to σ¯ , where
σ¯ I = σ¯ J1 = σ¯
I
2 =
( 1
2 ,
1
2
)
.
The strategy σ¯ satisfies u1 (σ¯) = 14 , while the equilibrium strategy pi (where pi
I = (0,1), piJ1 = pi
J
2 =
( 1
2 ,
1
2
)
, as shown
in Section 4.2.1), gives utility u1 (pi) = 12 . Therefore the existence of algorithms from Lemma 4.2 proves Theorem 4.1.
The key idea behind Lemma 4.2 is the following: both players repeat the pattern from Section 4.2.1, but we let
them perform random checks which detect any major deviations from this pattern. If both players do this, then by
Section 4.2.1 they observe no regret at any of the nodes. On the other hand, if one of them deviates enough to cause
a non-negligible regret, they will be detected by the other player, who then switches to a “safe” ε-HC algorithm,
leading again to a low regret. The definition of the modified algorithms used in Lemma 4.2, along with the proof of
their properties, can be found in Appendix B.2.
4.3 Breaking the counterexample: SM-MCTS-A
We now discuss the pathological behavior of SM-MCTS above and explain how these issues are avoided by SM-
MCTS-A and some other algorithms.
Firstly, what makes the counterexample work? The SM-MCTS algorithm repeatedly observes parts of the game
tree to estimate the value of available decisions. When sampling the node J, half of the rewards propagated upwards to
I have value 0, and half have value 1. SM-MCTS uses these payoffs directly and our rigged sampling scheme abuses
this by introducing a payoff observation bias – that is, by making the zeros ‘stay’ three times longer than the ones10.
This causes the algorithm sitting at I to estimate the value vJ of J as 14 (when in reality, it is
1
2 ). Since
1
4 is the average
payoff at I, the algorithm at I suffers no regret, and it can keep on working in this pathological manner.
The culprit here is the payoff observation bias11, made possible by the synchronization of the selection algorithm
used at I with the rewards coming from J.
So, why does SM-MCTS-A work in the counterexample above, when SM-MCTS did not? SM-MCTS-A also uses
the biased payoffs, but instead of directly using the most recent sample, it works with the average of samples observed
thus far. Since these averages converge to vJ = 12 , the estimates of v
J will also converge to this value, and no amount
of ‘rigged weighting’ can ruin this. The only way to obtain the average reward of 12 is to (almost) always play Y at I
and because the algorithm used at I is HC, this is exactly what will happen.
Thus when using SM-MCTS-A, we will successfully find a NE of the game G, even when the observations made
by the selection algorithms are very much biased. This argument can be generalized for an arbitrary game and a HC
algorithm – we will do so in Theorem 5.4.
We conjecture that guaranteed convergence of SM-MCTS might still be possible, provided that the algorithms used
as selection policies were HC and that the strategies prescribed by them changed slowly enough - such as is the case
with Exp3 (where the strategies change slower and slower).12
10For an explanation of the payoff observation bias, see “No-regret-at-I” paragraph in Section 4.2.1.
11More on this in Section 7.2.
12When the the sampling strategies are constant, no synchronization like above is possible, which makes the payoff observations unbiased. We
believe that when the strategies change slowly enough, the situation might be similar.
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4.4 Breaking the counterexample: CFR
In Section 2.5 we described the CFR algorithm, which provably converges in our setting. We now explain how CFR
deals with the counterexample.
It is a feature of MCTS that at each iteration, we only ‘care’ about the nodes we visited and we ignore the rest.
The downside is that we never realize that every time we do not visit J, the strategy suggested for J by our algorithm
performs extremely poorly. On the other hand, CFR visits every node in the game tree in every iteration. This makes
it immune to our counterexample – indeed, if we are forced to care about what happens at J during every iteration,
we can no longer keep on getting three zero payoffs for every 1 while still being Hannan consistent. The same holds
for MCCFR, a Monte Carlo variant of CFR which no longer traverses the whole tree each iteration, but instead only
samples a small portion of it.
5 Convergence of SM-MCTS and SM-MCTS-A
In this section, we present the main positive results – Theorems 5.4 and 5.12. Apart from a few cases, we only present
the key ideas of the proofs here, while the full proofs can be found in the appendix. For an overview of the notation we
use, see Table 2.
To ensure that the SM-MCTS(-A) algorithm will eventually visit each node, we need the selection policy to satisfy
the following property.
Definition 5.1. We say that A is an algorithm with guaranteed exploration if, for any simultaneous-move zero-sum
game13 G (as further specified in Section 2.1) where A is used by both players as a selection policy for SM-MCTS(-A),
and for any game node h ∈H , limt→∞ thi j = ∞ holds almost surely for every joint action (i, j) ∈A1(h)×A2(h).
It is an immediate consequence of this definition that when an algorithm with guaranteed exploration is used in
SM-MCTS(-A), every node of the game tree will be visited infinitely many times. From now on, we will therefore
assume that, at the start of our analysis, the full game tree is already built — we do this because it will always happen
after a finite number of iterations and, in most cases, we are only interested in the limit behavior of SM-MCTS(-A)
(which is not affected by the events in the first finitely many steps).
Note that most of the HC algorithms, namely RM and Exp3, guarantee exploration without the need for any
modifications, but there exist some HC algorithms, which do not have this property. However, they can always be
adjusted in the following way:
Definition 5.2. Let A be a bandit algorithm. For fixed exploration parameter γ ∈ (0,1) we define a modified algorithm
Aγ as follows. For time t = 1,2, ... either:
a) explore with probability γ , or
b) run one iteration of A with probability 1− γ
(where “explore” means we choose the action randomly uniformly over available actions, without updating any of
the variables belonging to A).
We define an algorithm A
√· analogously, except that at time t, the probability of exploration is 1/
√
t rather than γ .
Fortunately, ε-Hannan consistency is not substantially influenced by the additional exploration:
Lemma 5.3. For ε ≥ 0, let A be an ε-Hannan consistent algorithm.
(i) For any γ > 0, Aγ is an (ε+ γ)-HC algorithm with guaranteed exploration.
(ii) A
√· is an ε-HC algorithm with guaranteed exploration.
The proof of this lemma can be found in the appendix.
13We define the guaranteed exploration property this way (using extensive form games) to avoid further technicalities. Alternatively, we could
define ”two-player adversarial MAB problem” analogously to how adversarial MAB problem is defined in Definition 2.1, except that it would use
a setting similar to the first part of Definition 5.8. We would then say that A is an algorithm with guaranteed exploration if, for any reward assignment(
ai j(t)
)
, the limit is almost surely infinity for all joint actions.
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5.1 Asymptotic convergence of SM-MCTS-A
A HC selection will always minimize the regret with respect to the values used as an input. But as we have seen
in Section 4, using the observed values with no modification might introduce a bias, so that we end up minimizing
the wrong quantity. One possible solution is to first modify the input by taking the averages, as in SM-MCTS-A. The
high-level idea behind averaging is that it forces each pair of selection policies to optimize with respect to the subgame
values vhi j, which leads to the following result:
Theorem 5.4. Let ε ≥ 0 and let G be a zero-sum game with perfect information and simultaneous moves with maximal
depth D and let A be an ε-Hannan consistent algorithm with guaranteed exploration, which we use as a selection
policy for SM-MCTS-A.
Then almost surely, the empirical frequencies (σˆ1(t), σˆ2(t)) will eventually get arbitrarily close to a subgame-
perfect Cε-equilibrium, where C = 2D(D+1).
For ε = 0, Thorem 5.4 gives the following:
Corollary 5.5. If the algorithm from Thorem 5.4 is Hannan-consistent, the resulting strategy will eventually get arbi-
trarily close to a Nash equilibrium.
To simplify the proofs, we assume that ε > 0 - the variant with ε = 0 can be obtained by sending ε to zero, or by
minor modifications of the proofs. We will first state two preliminary results, then we use an extension of the later one
to prove Theorem 5.4 by backward induction. Firstly, we recall the following well-known fact, which relates the quality
of the best responses available to the players with the concept of an equilibrium.
Lemma 5.6. In a zero-sum game with value v the following holds:(
u1(br, σˆ2)< v+
ε
2
& u1(σˆ1,br)> v− ε2
)
=⇒(
u1 (br, σˆ2)−u1 (σˆ1, σˆ2)< ε & u2 (σˆ1,br)−u2 (σˆ1, σˆ2)< ε
)
def⇐⇒
(σˆ1, σˆ2) is an ε-equilibrium.
In order to start the backward induction, we first need to study what happens on the lowest level of the game tree,
where the nodes consist of matrix games. It is well-known that in a zero sum matrix game, the average strategies of two
Hannan consistent players will eventually get arbitrarilly close to a Nash equilibrium – see Waugh (2009) and Blum
and Mansour (2007). We prove a similar result for the approximate versions of the notions.
Lemma 5.7. Let ε ≥ 0 be a real number. If both players in a matrix game M are ε-Hannan consistent, then the
following inequalities hold almost surely:
vM− ε ≤ liminf
t→∞ g
M(t)≤ limsup
t→∞
gM(t)≤ vM + ε, (5.1)
vM−2ε ≤ liminf
t→∞ u
M
1 (σˆ1(t),br) & limsup
t→∞
uM1 (br, σˆ2(t))≤ vM +2ε. (5.2)
The inequalities (5.1) are a consequence of the definition of ε-HC and the game value vM . The proof of inequality
(5.2) then shows that if the value caused by the empirical frequencies was outside of the interval infinitely many times
with positive probability, it would be in contradiction with the definition of ε-HC.
Now, assume that the players are repeatedly playing some matrix game M, but they receive slightly distorted infor-
mation about their payoffs. This is exactly the situation which will arise when a stacked matrix game is being solved by
SM-MCTS-A and the “players” are selection algorithms deployed at a non-terminal node h (where the average payoffs
ghi j(t) coming from subgames rooted in hi j are never exactly equal to vhi j). Such a setting can be formalized as follows:
Definition 5.8 (Repeated matrix game with bounded distortion). Consider the following general problem (M˜). Let
m,n ∈ N. For each t ∈ N, the following happens
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1. Nature chooses a matrix M˜(t) =
(
vM˜i j (t)
)
∈ [0,1]m×n;
2. Players 1 and 2 choose actions i≤ m and j ≤ n and observe the number vM˜i j (t). This choice can be random and
might depend on the previously observed rewards and selected actions (that is vM˜i(s) j(s)(s) and i(s), resp. j(s) for
player 2, for s < t).
Let δ > 0. We call (M˜) a repeated matrix game with δ -bounded distortion if the following holds:
• For each i, j, t, vM˜i j (t) is a random variable possibly depending on the choice of actions i(s), j(s) for s < t.
• There exists a matrix M = (vMi j ) ∈ [0,1]m×n, such that almost surely:
∃t0 ∈ N ∀t ≥ t0 ∀i, j :
∣∣∣vM˜i j (t)− vMi j ∣∣∣≤ δ .
From first player’s point of view, each repeated matrix game with bounded distortion can be seen as an adversarial
MAB problem (PM˜) with reward assignment
xM˜i (t) := v
M˜
i j(t)(t).
When referring to the quantities related to (PM˜), we add a superscript M˜ – in particular, this concerns RM˜ , gM˜ , gM˜max
(and so on) from (3.2) and (3.3) and the empirical frequencies σˆ M˜(t) corresponding to the actions selected in (PM˜).
Recall that vM and uMp for p = 1,2 stand for the value and utility function corresponding to the matrix game M.
We formulate the following analogy of Lemma 5.7, which shows that ε-HC algorithms perform well even if they
observe slightly perturbed rewards.
Proposition 5.9. Let c,ε > 0 and let (M˜) be a repeated matrix game with cε-bounded distortion, played by two ε-HC
players. Then the following inequalities hold almost surely:
vM− (c+1)ε ≤ liminf
t→∞ g
M˜(t)≤ limsup
t→∞
gM˜(t)≤ vM +(c+1)ε, (5.3)
vM−2(c+1)ε ≤ liminf
t→∞ u
M
1 (σˆ1,br)≤ limsup
t→∞
uM1 (br, σˆ2)≤ vM +2(c+1)ε. (5.4)
The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 5.7. It needs an additional claim that if the algorithm is ε-HC with
respect to the observed values with errors, it still has a bounded regret with respect to the exact values.
Next, we present the induction hypothesis around which the proof of Theorem 5.4 revolves. We consider the setting
from Theorem 5.4 and let η > 0 be a small positive constant. For d ∈ {1, ...,D} we denote Cd := d+O(η).14 If a node
h in the game tree is terminal, we denote dh = 0. For other nodes, we inductively define dh, the depth of the sub-tree
rooted at h, as the maximum of dhi j over its children hi j, increased by one. Recall that for (i, j) ∈ A1(h)×A2(h),
vhi j = v
hi j ∈ [0,1] is the value of the subgame rooted at the child node hi j of h.
Induction hypothesis (IHd) is the claim that for each node h with dh = d, there almost surely exists t0 such that for
each t ≥ t0
(i) the payoff gh(t) will fall into the interval
(
vh−Cdε,vh+Cdε
)
;
(ii) the utilities uMh1 (σˆ1(t),br) and u
Mh
1 (br, σˆ2(t)) with respect to the matrix game Mh :=
(
vhi j
)
i, j
will fall into the in-
terval
(
vh−2Cdε,vh+2Cdε
)
.
14Our proofs use many inequalities that hold up to a depth-dependent noise, which we denote as Mdη . However, this noise can be made arbitrarily
small by choosing the right η at the start of each proof. The exact value of Md is therefore unimportant, and we hide it using the big O notation.
Note that multiplying O(η) by ε still yields O(η), since we can always assume ε ≤ 1 (the utilities are bounded by 1 by definition).
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As we mentioned above, any node h with dh = 1 is actually a matrix game. Therefore Lemma 5.7 ensures that
(IH1) holds. In order to get Theorem 5.4, we only need the property (ii) to hold for every h ∈H . The condition (i) is
“only” required for the induction itself to work.
We now show that in the setting of Theorem 5.4, the induction step works. This is the part of the proof where
we see the difference between SM-MCTS and SM-MCTS-A – in SM-MCTS, the rewards will be different over time,
due to the randomness of used strategies. But the averaged rewards, which SM-MCTS-A uses, will eventually be
approximately the same as values of the respective game nodes. This allows us to view the situation in every node as
a repeated game with bounded distortion and apply Proposition 5.9.
Proposition 5.10. In the setting from Theorem 5.4, the implication (IHd) =⇒ (IHd+1) holds for every d ∈ {1, . . . ,D−
1}.
Proof. Assume that (IHd) holds and let h be a node with dh = d+1. We will describe the situation in h as a repeated
matrix game (M˜h) with bounded distortion:
• The corresponding ‘non-distorted’ matrix is Mh :=
(
vhi j
)
i, j
.
• The actions available to the players 1 and 2 are i ∈A1(h) and j ∈A2(h).
• The actions i(t), j(t) chosen by the players are the actions ih(t), jh(t).15
• The “distorted” rewards vM˜hi j (t) are the average rewards g
h
i j coming from the subgames rooted in the children of
h. The exact correspondence is
vM˜hi j (t) := g
h
i j(t
h
i j).
In other words, vM˜hi j (t) is the average of the first t
h
i j rewards obtained by visiting hi j during SM-MCTS-A.
In particular, we have xM˜hi (t) = v
M˜h
i j(t)(t) = g
h
i jh(t)(t
h
i j). Comparing this with the definition of x¯
h
i (t) from Section 3, we
see that the MAB problems (P¯h) and (PM˜h) coincide. As a result, Proposition 5.9 can be applied to the actions taken at
h (assuming we can bound the distortion).
By (i) from (IHd), the distortion of (M˜h) is eventually bounded by Cdε = dε +O(η). Consequentially, we can
apply Proposition 5.9 — the inequality (5.3) shows that the average rewards gh will eventually belong to the interval(
vh− ((Cd +1)ε+η) ,vh+(Cd +1)ε+η
)
. Since (Cd +1)ε+η =Cd+1ε , (i) from (IHd+1) holds. The property (ii)
follows from the inequality (5.4) in Proposition 5.9.
We are now ready to give the proof of Theorem 5.4. Essentially, it consists of summing up the errors from the first
part of the induction hypothesis and using Lemma 5.6.
Proof of Theorem 5.4. First, we observe that by Lemma 5.7, (IH1) holds, and consequently by Proposition 5.10, (IHd)
holds for every d = 1, ...,D.
Denote by uh(σ) (resp. uhi j(σ)) the expected player 1 payoff corresponding to the strategy σ used in the subgame
rooted at node h ∈H (resp. its child hi j). By Lemma 5.6 we know that in order to prove Theorem 5.4, it is enough to
show that for every h ∈H , the strategy σˆ (t) will eventually satisfy
uh (br, σˆ2 (t))≤ vh+(dh+1)dhε+O(η). (5.5)
The role of both players in the whole text is symmetric, therefore (5.5) also implies the second inequality required by
Lemma 5.6. We will do this by backward induction.
Since any node h with dh = 1 is a matrix game, it satisfies (Ph) = (PMh) and uh = u
Mh
1 . In particular, (ii) from
(IH1) implies that the inequality (5.5) holds for any such h. Let 1 < d ≤D, h ∈H be such that dh = d and assume, as
a hypothesis for backward induction, that the inequality (5.5) holds for each h′ with dh′ < d. We observe that
uh (br, σˆ2 (t)) = max
i∈A1(h)
∑
j∈A2(h)
σˆh2 (t)( j)u
h
i j (br, σˆ2 (t))
15Recall that by definition in (3.6), ih(t) and jh(t) are the actions chosen by SM-MCTS-A during the t-th visit of the node h.
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≤ vh+
(
max
i∈A1(h)
∑
j∈A2(h)
σˆh2 (t)( j)v
h
i j− vh
)
+
+ max
i∈A1(h)
∑
j∈A2(h)
σˆh2 (t)( j)
(
uhi j (br, σˆ2 (t))− vhi j
)
.
Since vhi j = v
Mh
i j , the first term in the brackets is equal to u
Mh
1 (br, σˆ
h
2 )− vh . By (ii) from (IHd), this is bounded by
2dε+η . By the backward induction hypothesis we have
uhi j (br, σˆ2 (t))− vhi j ≤ d (d−1)ε+O(η)
Therefore we have
uh (br, σˆ2 (t))≤ vh+2dε+d (d−1)ε+O(η) = vh+(d+1)dε+O(η).
For d = D, h = root, Lemma 5.6 implies that (σˆ1 (t) , σˆ2 (t)) forms a (2D(D+1)ε+O(η))-equilibrium of the whole
game.
5.2 Asymptotic convergence of SM-MCTS
We would like to prove an analogous result to Theorem 5.4 for SM-MCTS. Unfortunately, such a goal is unattainable
in general – in Section 4 we presented a counterexample, showing that a such a theorem with no additional assumptions
does not hold. We show that if an ε-HC algorithm with guaranteed exploration has an additional property of ‘having
ε-unbiased payoff observations’ (ε-UPO, see Definition 5.11), it can be used as a selection policy for SM-MCTS,
and it will always find an approximate equilibrium (Theorem 5.12). While we were unable to prove that specific ε-
HC algorithms have the ε-UPO property, in Section 7, we provide empirical evidence supporting our hypothesis that
the ‘typical’ algorithms, such as regret matching or Exp3, indeed do have ε-unbiased payoff observations.
5.2.1 Definition of the UPO property
First, we introduce the notation required for the definition of the ε-UPO property. Recall that for h ∈H and a joint
action (i, j) ∈ A1(h)×A2(h), xhi j(m) = xhi j(m) denotes the m-th reward16 received when visiting h’s child node hi j.
We denote the arithmetic average of the sequence (xhi j(1), . . . , x
h
i j(n)) as
x¯hi j (n) =
1
n
n
∑
m=1
xhi j (m) . (5.6)
The numbers x¯hi j are the variables we would prefer to work with. Indeed, their definition is quite intuitive and when A
is ε-HC and dhi j = 1, the averages x¯
h
i j(n) can be used to approximate v
h
i j:
limsup
n
∣∣∣x¯hi j (n)− vhi j∣∣∣≤ ε.
Unfortunately, the variables x¯hi j (n) do not suffice for our analysis, because as we have seen in Section 4, even
when the differences
∣∣∣x¯hi j (n)− vhi j∣∣∣ get arbitrarily small, SM-MCTS might still perform very poorly. In (5.7), we define
differently weighted averages x˜hi j(n) of (x
h
i j(1), . . . , x
h
i j(n)) which naturally appear in this setting and are crucial in
the proof of the upcoming Theorem 5.12. Before we jump into details, let us expand on an idea that we already hinted
at earlier:
Assume that a node hi j has already been visited (m−1)-times or, equivalently, that thi j =m. We can compute the m-
th reward xhi j(m) in advance and when player 2 selects j for the first time at some s ≥ t, we offer xhi j(m) as a possible
16Note that xhi j(t) are random variables and their distribution depends on the game to which h belongs and on the selection policies applied at all
of the nodes in the subgame rooted in hi j .
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reward xhi (s). However, if player 1 plays something other than i at s, x
h
i j(m) does not “get used up” – instead it “waits”
to be used in future. Therefore, each reward xhi j(m) must be weighted proportionally to the number w
h
i j(m) of times it
got offered as a possible reward (including the one time when it eventually got chosen), because this is the number of
times it will show up when regret Rh is calculated.
We define the weights wi j (n) and the weighted averages x˜i j (n) as follows17:
whi j (m) :=
∣∣∣{t ∈ N| thi j = m & jh(t) = j}∣∣∣ (5.7)
x˜hi j (n) :=
1
∑nm=1 whi j (m)
n
∑
m=1
whi j (m)∗ xhi j (m) ,
We are now ready to give the definition:
Definition 5.11 (UPO). We say that an algorithm A guarantees ε-unbiased payoff observations, if for every (simultaneous-
move zero-sum perfect information) game G in which A is used as a selection policy for SM-MCTS, for its every node
h and every joint action (i, j), the arithmetic averages x¯hi j and weighted averages x˜
h
i j almost surely satisfy
limsup
n→∞
∣∣∣x˜hi j (n)− x¯hi j (n)∣∣∣≤ ε.
We will abbreviate this by saying that “A is an ε-UPO algorithm”.
Observe in particular that for an ε-UPO algorithm and c > 0, we have,
limsup
n→∞
∣∣∣x¯hi j (n)− vhi j∣∣∣≤ cε a.s. =⇒ limsup
n→∞
∣∣∣x˜hi j (n)− vhi j∣∣∣≤ (c+1)ε a.s..
The most relevant ‘examples’ related to the UPO property are
a) the pathological algorithms from Section 4.2.1, where the UPO property does not hold (and SM-MCTS fails to find
a reasonable strategy),
b) Theorem 5.12 below, which states that when a HC algorithm is UPO, it finds an equilibrium strategy,
c) if at each node h, players chose their actions as independent samples of some probability distributions Ph1 and P
h
2
over A1(h) and A2(h), then these selection ‘algorithms’ are UPO.
We agree that the definition of the UPO property, as presented in Definition 5.11, is quite impractical. Unfortu-
nately, we were unable to find a replacement property which would be easier to check while still allowing the “HC &
? =⇒ SM-MCTS finds a NE” proof to go through. We at least provide some more examples and a further discussion
in the appendix (Section B.1).
5.2.2 The convergence of SM-MCTS
The goal of this section is to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 5.12. For ε ≥ 0, let A be an ε-HC algorithm with guaranteed exploration that is ε-UPO. If A is used as
selection policy for SM-MCTS, then the average strategy of A will eventually get arbitrarily close to a C′ε-NE of
the whole game, where C′ = 12
(
2D−1)−8D.
Note that if we prove the statement for ε > 0, we get the variant with ε = 0 ‘for free’. The proof of Theorem 5.12 is
similar to the proof of Theorem 5.4. The only major difference is Proposition 5.13, which serves as a replacement for
Proposition 5.9 (which cannot be applied to SM-MCTS). Essentially, Proposition 5.13 shows that under the specified
assumptions, having low “local” regret in some h ∈H with respect to xhi (t) is sufficient to bound the regret with
respect to the rewards originating from the matrix game
(
vhi j
)
.
17By whi j (m)∗ xhi j (m) we mean the sum of whi j (m) independent copies of xhi j (m).
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Proposition 5.13. For ε,c≥ 0 let an algorithm A be ε-HC and h ∈H . If A is ε-UPO and limsup
n→∞
∣∣∣x¯hi j (n)− vhi j∣∣∣≤ cε
holds a.s. for each i, j, then
limsup
t→∞
1
t
(
max
i
t
∑
s=1
vhi j(s)−
t
∑
s=1
vhi(s) j(s)
)
≤ 2(c+1)ε holds a.s.. (5.8)
In particular, the regret rMh(t) of A with respect to the matrix game Mh =
(
vhi j
)
i j
satisfies
limsup
t→∞
rMh(t)≤ 2(c+1)ε.
The proof of this proposition consists of rewriting the sums in inequality (5.8) and using the fact that the weighted
averages x˜i j are close to the standard averages x¯i j.
Consider the setting from Theorem 5.12 and let η > 0 be a positive constant. For d ∈ {1, ...,D} we denote C′d :=
3 ·2d−1−2+O(η).
Induction hypothesis
(
IH ′d
)
is the claim that for each node h with dh = d, there almost surely exists t0 such that for
each t ≥ t0
1. the payoff gh(t) fall into the interval
(
vh−C′dε,vh+C′dε
)
;
2. the utilities uMh (σˆ1(t),br) and uMh (br, σˆ2(t)) with respect to the matrix game Mh =
(
vhi j
)
i, j
fall into the interval(
vh−2C′dε,vh+2C′dε
)
.
Proposition 5.14. In the setting from Theorem 5.12,
(
IH ′d
)
holds for every d ∈ {1, . . . ,D}.
Proof. We proceed by backward induction – since the algorithm A is ε-HC, we know that, by Lemma 5.7,
(
IH
′
1
)
holds
with C′1 = 1+O(η). Assume that (IH
′
d) holds for some d ∈ {1, . . . ,D−1}. By the “in particular” part of Proposition
5.13, the choice of actions in h is 2
(
C′d +1
)
-HC with respect to the matrix game (vhi j). By Lemma 5.7, (IH
′
d+1) holds
with C′d+1 := 2
(
C′d +1
)
+O(η). It remains to show that C′d+1 is equal to 3 ·2d−2+O(η):
C′d+1 = 2
(
C′d +1
)
+O(η) = 2
(
3 ·2d−1−2+1
)
+O(η) = 3 ·2d−2+O(η).
Analogously to Proposition 5.10 from Section 5.1, this in turn implies the main theorem of this section, the proof
of which is similar to the proof of Theorem 5.4.
Proof of Theorem 5.12. Using Proposition 5.14, the proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 5.4 – it remains to
determine the value of C′. As in the proof of Theorem 5.4 we have C′ = 2 · 2∑Dd=1 C′d , and we need to calculate this
sum:
D
∑
d=1
C′d =
D
∑
d=1
(
3 ·2d−1−2
)
= 3
(
1+ ...+2D−1
)−2D = 3(2D−1)−2D.
5.3 Dependence of the eventual NE distance on the game depth
In Theorems 5.4 and 5.12, the bound on the distance of the average strategy to a NE (as measured by the constant C) is
quadratic, resp. exponential, in the game depth. We investigate how far can the dependence by improved, constructing
a counterexample where we lower-bound C by some constant times the depth. However, the more general question of
lower-bounds remains open and is posed as Problem 5.17.
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Figure 3: A game tree of a single-player game where the quality of a strategy has linear dependence on the exploration
parameter and on the game depth D. The numbers ud satisfy 0 < u1 < u2 < · · · < uD < 1. The player begins in
the leftmost node and the numbers correspond to utilities in terminal nodes.
Proposition 5.15. There exists k > 0, such that none of the Theorems 5.4 and 5.12 hold if the constant C is replaced
by C˜ = kD. This holds even when the exploration is removed from σˆ .
The proposition above follows from Example 5.16.
Example 5.16 (Distance from NE)). Let G be the single player game18 from Figure 3, η > 0 some small number, and
D the depth of the game tree. Let Exp3 with exploration parameter γ = kε be our ε-HC algorithm (for a suitable choice
of k). We recall that this algorithm will eventually identify the optimal action and play it with frequency 1− γ , and it
will choose randomly otherwise. Denote the available actions at each node as (up, right, down), resp. (right, down) at
the rightmost inner node. We define each of the rewards ud , d = 1, ...,D−1 in such a way that Exp3 will always prefer
to go up, rather than right. By induction over d, we can see that the choice u1 = 1− γ/2+η , ud+1 = (1− γ/3)ud is
sufficient and for η small enough, we have
uD−1 = (1− γ2 +η)(1−
γ
3
) . . .(1− γ
3
)≤
(
1− γ
3
)D−1 .
= 1− D−1
3
γ
(where by .= we mean that for small γ , in which we are interested, the difference between the two terms is negligible).
Consequently in each of the nodes, Exp3 will converge to the strategy
(
1− 23γ, 13γ, 13γ
)
(resp.
(
1− γ2 , γ2
)
), which yields
the payoff of approximately (1− γ/3)uD−1. Clearly, the expected utility of such a strategy is approximately
u = (1− γ/3)D .= 1− D
3
γ.
On the other hand, the optimal strategy of always going right leads to utility 1, and thus our strategy σˆ is D3 γ-
equilibrium.
Note that in this particular example, it makes no difference whether SM-MCTS or SM-MCTS-A is used. We also
observe that when the exploration is removed, the new strategy is to go up at the first node with probability 1, which
again leads to regret of approximately D3 γ .
By increasing the branching factor of the game in the previous example from 3 to b (adding more copies of the “0”
nodes) and modifying the values of ud accordingly, we could make the above example converge to 2 b−2b Dγ-equilibrium
(resp. b−2b Dγ once the exploration is removed).
We were able to construct a game of depth D and ε-HC algorithms, such that the resulting strategy σˆ converged
to 3Dε-equilibrium (2Dε after removing the exploration). However, the ε-HC algorithms used in this example are
non-standard and would require the introduction of more technical notation. Therefore, since in our main theorem we
use quadratic dependence C = kD2, we instead choose to highlight the following open question:
Problem 5.17. Does Theorem 5.4 (and Theorem 5.12) hold with C = kD for some k > 0? If not, what is the optimal
value of C?
We hypothesize that the answer is affirmative (and possibly the values k = 3, resp. k = 2 after exploration removal,
are optimal), but the proof of such proposition would require techniques different from the one used in the proof of
Theorem 5.4. Moreover, it might be more interesting to consider Problem 5.17 restricted to some class of “reasonable”
no-regret algorithms, as opposed to arbitrary HC algorithms such as those presented in Section 4.
18The other player always has only a single no-op action.
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6 Exploitability and exploration removal
In this section, we discuss which strategy should be considered the output of our algorithms. We also introduce
the concept of exploitability – a common approach to measuring strategy strength that focuses on the worst-case
performance (see for example Johanson et al. 2011):
Definition 6.1. Exploitability of strategy σ1 of player 1 is the quantity
expl1 (σ1) := v−u1 (σ1,br) ,
where v is the value of the game and br is a second player’s best response strategy to σ1. Similarly, we denote
expl2 (σ2) := u1 (br,σ2)− v and expl(σ) := expl1(σ1)+ expl2(σ1).
By definition of the game value, exploitability is always non-negative. Exploitability is closely related Nash equilibria,
since we apparently have expl1 (σ1) = expl2 (σ2) = 0 if and only if σ = (σ1,σ2) forms a NE.
If SM-MCT(-A) is run for t iterations, the obvious candidates for its output are the strategy σ(t) from the last
iteration, the average strategy σ¯(t) = 1t ∑
t
s=1σ(s) (defined in Eq. 3.8), and the empirical frequencies σˆ(t) (which are
equivalent to σ¯(t) by Lemma 3.1). Most theoretical results only give guarantees for σ¯(t), and indeed, using σ(t) would
be naive as it is often very exploitable. However, there is a better option than using σ¯(t).
To improve the learning rate and ensure that the important parts of the game tree are found quickly, the selection
functions used by SM-MCTS(-A) often have a fixed exploration rate γ > 0. This can happen either naturally (like with
Exp3) or because it has been added artificially (cf. Definition 5.2). Each strategy σ(t) is then of the form
σ(s) = (1− γ)µ(s)+ γ · rnd (6.1)
for some µ(t) (where rnd denotes the uniformly random strategy). Rewriting σ¯(t) as
σ¯(s) =
1
t
t
∑
s=1
σ(s) =
1
t
t
∑
s=1
[(1− γ)µ(s)+ γ · rnd] = (1− γ)µ¯(t)+ γ · rnd, (6.2)
we see that it contains the exact same amount of the random noise caused by exploration. While the exploration speeds
up learning, it also increases the exploitability of σ¯1 in three ways: (a) it introduces noise to each σ¯h1 , (b) it does the
same for the opponent, giving us inaccurate expectations about how an optimal opponent looks like and (c) it introduces
a noise to the rewards SM-MCTS(-A) propagates upward in the tree. As a heuristic, Teytaud and Flory 2011 suggest
that the exploration should be removed. In our case, we can use (6.2) to obtain the “denoised” average strategy µ¯(t):
µ¯ (t) :=
1
(1− γ) (σ¯ (t)− γ · rnd) . (6.3)
Using µ¯(t) instead of σ¯(t) cannot help with (b) and (c), but it does serve as an effective remedy for (a). This intuition
is captured by Proposition 6.2, which shows that a better exploitability bound can be obtained if the exploration is
removed. The experiments in Section 7 verify that the benefit of removing the exploration in SM-MCTS is indeed
large.
Proposition 6.2. Let M be a matrix game, A a HC algorithm, γ > 0, and Aγ the “γ-exploration modification” of A
from Definition 5.2. Let σ¯(t) be the average strategy obtained if both players use Aγ in M, and let µ¯(t) be as in (6.3).
Then for each p we have
(i) limsupt explp(σ¯p(t))≤ 2γ ,
(ii) limsupt explp(µ¯p(t))≤ γ .
Lemma 5.7 gives (i) from Proposition 6.2 as a special case, and, as shown in the last part of the appendix, going
through its proof in more detail yields (ii).
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Figure 4: The Anti game used for evaluation of the algorithms.
7 Experimental evaluation
In this section, we present the experimental data related to our theoretical results. First, we empirically evaluate
our hypothesis that Exp3 and regret matching algorithms ensure the ε-UPO property. Second, we test the empirical
convergence rates of SM-MCTS and SM-MCTS-A on synthetic games as well as smaller variants of games played
by people. We investigate the practical dependence of the convergence error based on the important parameters of
the games and evaluate the effect of removing the samples due to exploration from the computed strategies. We
show that SM-MCTS generally converges as close to the equilibrium as SM-MCTS-A, but does it substantially faster.
Therefore, since the commonly used Hannan consistent algorithms seem to satisfy the ε-UPO property, SM-MCTS if
the preferable algorithm for practical applications.
At the time of writing this paper, the best theoretically sound alternative to SM-MCTS known to us is a modification
of MCCFR called Online Outcome Sampling (OOS, Lisy et al. 2015). For a comparison of SM-MCTS, this variant
of MCCFR, and several exact algorithms, we refer the reader to Bosˇansky´ et al. (2016). While OOS converges the
fastest out of the sampling algorithms in small games, it is often inferior to SM-MCTS in online game playing in larger
games, because of the large variance caused by the importance sampling corrections.
7.1 Experimental Domains
Goofspiel Goofspiel is a card game that appears in many works dedicated to simultaneous-move games (for example
Ross 1971; Rhoads and Bartholdi 2012; Saffidine et al. 2012; Lanctot et al. 2014; Bosˇansky´ et al. 2013). There are 3
identical decks of cards with values {0, . . . ,d−1} (one for nature and one for each player). Value of d is a parameter
of the game. The deck for the nature is shuffled at the beginning of the game. In each round, nature reveals the top
card from its deck. Each player selects any of their remaining cards and places it face-down on the table so that
the opponent does not see the card. Afterward, the cards are turned face-up, and the player with the higher card wins
the card revealed by nature. The card is discarded in case of a draw. At the end, the player with the higher sum of
the nature cards wins the game or the game is a draw. People play the game with 13 cards, but we use smaller numbers
to be able to compute the distance from the equilibrium (that is, exploitability) in a reasonable time. We further simplify
the game by a common assumption that both players know the sequence of the nature’s cards in advance.
Oshi-Zumo Each player in Oshi-Zumo (for example, Buro 2004) starts with N coins, and a one-dimensional playing
board with 2K + 1 locations (indexed 0, . . . ,2K) stretches between the players. At the beginning, there is a stone (or
a wrestler) located in the center of the board (that is, at position K). During each move, both players simultaneously
place their bid from the amount of coins they have (but at least one if they still have some coins). Afterward, the bids
are revealed, the coins used for bids are removed from the game, and the highest bidder pushes the wrestler one location
towards the opponent’s side. If the bids are the same, the wrestler does not move. The game proceeds until the money
runs out for both players, or the wrestler is pushed out of the board. The player closer to the wrestler’s final position
loses the game. If the final position of the wrestler is the center, the game is a draw. In our experiments, we use
a version with K = 2 and N = 5.
Random Game To achieve more general results, we also use randomly generated games. The games are defined
by the number of actions B available to each player in each decision point and a depth D (D = 0 for leaves), which
is the same for all branches. Each joint action is associated with a uniformly-random reward from {−1,0,1}, and
the corresponding accumulated utilities in leaves are integers between −D and D.
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Figure 5: The maximum of the bias in payoff observations in SM-MCTS without averaging the sample values (see
the second paragraph in Section 7.2).
Anti The last game we use in our evaluation is based on the well-known single player game which demonstrates
the super-exponential convergence time of the UCT algorithm (Coquelin and Munos 2007). The game is depicted in
Figure 4. In each stage, it deceives the MCTS algorithm to end the game while it is optimal to continue until the end.
7.2 ε-UPO property
To be able to apply Theorem 5.12 (that is, the convergence of SM-MCTS without averaging) to Exp3 and regret
matching, the selection algorithms have to assure the ε-UPO property for some ε . So far, we were unable to prove this
hypothesis. Instead, we support this claim by the following numerical experiments. Recall that having ε-UPO property
is defined as the claim that for every game node h ∈H and every joint action (i, j) available at h, the difference∣∣x¯i j (n)− x˜i j (n)∣∣ between the weighted and arithmetical averages decreases below ε , as the number n of uses of (i, j)
at h increases to infinity. We can think of this difference as a bias between real and observed average payoffs.
We measured the value of the difference in the sums in the root node of the four domains described above. Besides
the random games, the depth of the game was set to 5. For the random games, the depth and the branching factor was
B = D = 3. Figure 5 presents one graph for each domain and each algorithm. The x-axis is the number of iterations
and the y-axis depicts the maximum value of the difference
∣∣x¯i j (n)− x˜i j (n)∣∣ from the iteration on the x-axis to the end
of the run of the algorithm (maxn∈(x,...,108),i, j
∣∣x¯i j (n)− x˜i j (n)∣∣). The presented value is the maximum from 50 runs of
the algorithms. For all games, the difference eventually converges to zero. Generally, larger exploration ensures that
the difference goes to zero more quickly and the bias in payoff observation is smaller.
The main reason for the bias is easy to explain in the Anti game. Figure 6a presents the maximal values of the bias
in small time windows during the convergence from all 50 runs. It is apparent that the bias during the convergence
tends to jump very high (higher for smaller exploration) and then gradually decrease. This, however, happens only
until a certain point in time. The reason for this behavior is that if the algorithm learns an action is good in a specific
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Figure 6: The dependence of the current value of
∣∣x¯i j (n)− x˜i j (n)∣∣ on the number of iterations that used the given joint
action in (a) Anti game and (b) Goofspiel with 4 cards per deck.
state, it will use it very often and will do the updates for the action with much smaller weight in x˜i j (n) than the updates
for the other action. However, when the other action later proves to be substantially better, the value of that action
starts increasing rather quickly. At the same time, its probability of being played starts increasing, and as a result,
the weights used for the received rewards start decreasing. This will cause a strong dependence between the rewards
and the weights, which causes the bias. With smaller exploration, it takes more time to identify the better alternative
action; hence, when it happens, the wrong action has already accumulated larger reward and the discrepancy between
the right values and the probability of playing the actions is even stronger.
We also tested satisfaction of the UPO property in the root node of depth 4 Goofspiel, using Exp3 algorithm and
exploration ε = 0.001. The results in Figure 6b serve as evidence supporting our conjecture that Exp3 with exploration
0.001 possesses the 0.001-UPO property (however this time, higher n0 is required – around 5 ·106).
We can divide the joint actions (i, j) at the root into three groups: (1) the actions which both players play (nearly)
only when exploring, (2) the actions which one of the players chooses only because of the exploration, and (3) the ac-
tions which none of the players uses only because of the exploration. In Figure 6b, (1) is on the left, (2) in the middle and
(3) on the right. The third type of actions easily satisfied
∣∣x¯i j (n)− x˜i j (n)∣∣≤ ε , while for the second type, this inequality
seems to eventually hold as well. The shape of the graphs suggests that the difference between x¯i j (n) and x˜i j (n) will
eventually get below ε as well, however, the 109 iterations we used were not sufficient for this to happen. Luckily,
even if the inequality did not hold for these cases, it does not prevent the convergence of SM-MCTS to an approximate
equilibrium. In the proof of Proposition 5.13, the term
∣∣x¯i j (n)− x˜i j (n)∣∣ is weighted by the empirical frequencies t j/t,
resp. even ti j/t. If an action is only played when exploring, this number converges to ε/(number of actions), resp.
(ε/(number of actions))2, so even if we had
∣∣x¯i j (n)− x˜i j (n)∣∣= 1, we could still bound the required term by ε , which
is needed in the proof of the respective theorem.
7.2.1 Removing exploration
In Section 6, we show that the computed strategy should generally improve when we disregard the samples caused
by exploration. Figure 7 shows that the practical benefit is large, and suggests that the exploration should always be
removed, and we do so in all the experiments below.
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Figure 7: The effect of removing exploration in SM-MCTS with Exp3 selection and ε = 0.2.
7.3 Empirical convergence rate of SM-MCTS(-A) algorithms
In this section, we investigate the empirical convergence rates of the analyzed algorithms. We first compare the speeds
of convergence of SM-MCTS-A and SM-MCTS and then investigate the dependence of the error of the eventual
solution of the algorithms on relevant parameters. Finally, we focus on the effect of removing the exploration samples
discussed in Section 6. In all cases, “equilibrium distance” is measured by the exploitability expl(·) of the evaluated
strategy.
7.3.1 SM-MCTS with and without averaging
Figure 8 presents the dependence of the exploitability of the strategies produced by the algorithms on the number of
executed iterations. We compare the empirical speed and quality of convergence of SM-MCTS and SM-MCTS-A
with different setting of the exploration parameter, however, the samples caused by exploration are removed from
the strategy for both algorithms, as suggested in Section 6. All iterations are executed from the root of the game.
The colors (and line types) in the graphs represent different settings of the exploration parameter. SM-MCTS-A
(circles) seems to always converge to the same distance from the equilibrium as SM-MCTS (triangles), regardless
of the used selection function and exploration setting. The convergence of the variant with averaging is generally
slower. The difference is most visible in the Anti game with Exp3 selection function, where the averaging can cause
the convergence to require even ten times more iterations to reach the same distance from a NE as the algorithm without
averaging. The situation is similar also in Oshi-Zumo. However, the effect is much weaker with RM selection. With
the exception of the Anti game, the variants with and without averaging converge at almost the same speed.
7.3.2 Distance from the equilibrium
Even though the depth of most games in Figure 8 was 5, even with large exploration (0.4), the algorithm was often
able to find the exact equilibrium. This indicates that in practical problems, even the linear bound on the distance from
the equilibrium from the example in Section 8 is too pessimistic.
If the game contains pure Nash equilibria, as in Anti and the used setting of Oshi-Zumo, exact equilibrium can
often be found. If (non-uniform) mixed equilibria are required, the gap between the final solution and the equilibrium
increases both with the depth of the game and the amount of exploration. The effect of the amount of exploration is
visible in Figure 8c, where the largest exploration prevented the algorithm from converging to the exact equilibrium.
A more gradual effect is visible in Figures 8(g,h), where the exploitability seems to increase linearly with increasing
exploration. Note that in all cases, the exploitability (computed as the sum expl1 + expl2) was less than 2 · εM, where
ε is the amount of exploration and M is the maximum utility value.
Figure 9 presents the exploitability of SM-MCTS with Exp3 selection and exploration ε = 0.2 in random games
with B = 3 and various depths. The eventual error increases with increasing depth, but even with the depth of 6,
the eventual error was on average around 0.25 and always less than 0.3.
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Figure 8: Comparison of empirical convergence rates of SM-MCTS (triangles) and SM-MCTS-A (circles) with Exp3
and RM selection functions in various domains.
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Figure 9: Convergence (measured by exploitability) of SM-MCTS with Exp3 selection on random games with three
actions of each player in each stage and various depths.
8 Conclusion
We studied the convergence properties of learning dynamics in zero-sum extensive form games with simultaneous
moves, but otherwise perfect information (SMGs). These games generalize normal form games and are a special case
of extensive form games. Hannan consistent action selection by each player is known to converge to a Nash equilibrium
in normal form games. In general extensive form games, the convergence to a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed if both
players use in each of their decision points a separate selection strategy that is Hannan consistent with respect to
the counterfactual values. However, with a single simulation of the game play, the estimates of these values suffers
from a large variance. This causes the simulation-based algorithms that use counterfactual values to converge slowly in
larger games. We investigated whether the convergence can be achieved without using counterfactual values in SMGs.
The studied learning dynamic directly corresponds to a class of Monte Carlo Tree Search algorithms commonly used
for playing SMGs. There was very little pre-existing theory that would describe the behavior of the algorithms in these
games and provide guarantees on their performance.
Our main results show that using a separate Hannan consistent algorithm to choose actions in each decision point
of an SMG, which is the standard SM-MCTS, is not sufficient to guarantee the convergence of the learning dynamic
to a Nash equilibrium. This guarantee is obtained if the used selection function, in addition to being HC, guarantees
the Unbiased Payoff Observations property. We hypothesize that Exp3 and regret matching selection functions have this
property, and provide experimental evidence supporting this claim. Alternatively, the convergence can be guaranteed
with any HC selection, if one is willing to use SM-MCTS-A and accept the (empirically) slower convergence rate
caused by averaging the back-propagated values (Section 7.3).
Our other results are as follows. In Section 6, we provide an analysis of a previously suggested improvement of
SM-MCTS which proposes to remove the exploration samples from the algorithm’s output. We provide formal and
empirical evidence which suggests that this modification is sound and generally improves the strategy.
Table 1 summarizes some of the more detailed results. In Theorem 5.4 (5.12) we show that SM-MCTS-A (SM-
MCTS) algorithm with an ε-HC selection function eventually converges at least to a Cε-NE of a game, where for game
depth D, C is of the order D2 (2D). In Section 4, we show that the worst-case dependence of C on D cannot be sublinear,
even after the exploration is removed. This gives us both lower and upper bounds on the value of C, but it remains
to determine whether these bounds are tight. The same lower bound holds for both SM-MCTS and SM-MCTS-A,
which means they may in fact converge to the same distance from the equilibrium, as suggested by the experiments in
Section 7.3.2. We hypothesize that the upper bound bound is not tight (and that after exploration-removal, the optimal
value is C = 2D).
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SM-MCTS-A SM-MCTS
Assumptions ε-HC ε-HC, ε-UPO ε-HC only
Upper bound 2D(D+1)ε
(
12(2D−1)−8D)ε might not converge
Lower bound 2Dε 2Dε to an approx. NE at all
Table 1: Summary of the proven bounds on the worst-case eventual exploitability of the strategy produced by SM-
MCTS(-A) run with an ε-Hannan consistent selection function
8.1 Open problems and future work
While this paper provides a significant step towards understanding learning and Monte Carlo tree search in simultaneous-
move games, it also leaves some problems open. First of all, SM-MCTS is used because of the speed with which it
can find a good strategy. However, a practically useful bound on this speed of convergence is missing. Furthermore,
many of the guarantees presented in the paper have not been shown to be tight, so an obvious future research direction
would be to improve the guarantees or show the tightness of these results (Problem 5.17). These could be further
improved by allowing the exploration rate to depend on the position in the game tree. Finally, a better description
of the properties (of the selection policy) which guarantee that SM-MCTS converges to an optimal strategy could be
provided. In particular, it would be interesting to better understand the UPO property and, more generally, the propa-
gation of information and uncertainty in game trees with simultaneous moves. This would in turn enable either proving
that the common no-regret bandit algorithms indeed produce unbiased payoff observations, or finding some suitable
alternative to the UPO property. Moreover, focusing on these specific (non-pathological) algorithms or their suitable
modifications might simplify the derivation of tighter performance bounds.
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Appendix
The appendix contains the proofs for those results which have not been already proven in the main text.
A Proofs of Lemma 3.1 and 5.3
We start with the proof of Lemma 3.1, which states that eventually, there is no difference between the empirical and
the average strategies.
Lemma 3.1. In the limit, the empirical frequencies and average strategies will almost surely be equal. That is,
limsupt→∞maxi∈A1 |σˆ1(t)(i)− σ¯1(t)(i)|= 0 holds with probability 1.
Proof. It is enough to show that limsup
t→∞
|σˆ1h(t)(i)− σ¯1h(t)(i)| = 0 holds almost surely for any h and i. Without
changing the limit behavior of σˆ , we can assume that thi is defined as the number of uses of i during iterations 1, 2, . . . ,
t.19 Using the definitions of σˆ1h(t)(i) and σ¯1h(t)(i), we get
σˆ1h(t)(i)− σ¯1h(t)(i) = 1t
(
ti−
t
∑
s=1
σh1 (s)(i)
)
=
1
t
t
∑
s=1
(
δi,ih(s)−σh1 (s)(i)
)
,
where δi, j is the Kronecker delta. Using the (martingale version of) Central Limit Theorem on the sequence of random
variables Xt =∑ts=1
(
δi,ih(s)−σh1 (s)(i)
)
gives the result (the conditions clearly hold, since E
[
δi,ih(t)−σh1 (t)(i)
∣∣X1, ...,Xt−1]=
0 implies that Xt is a martingale and δi,ih(t)−σh1 (t)(i) ∈ [−1,1] guarantees that all required moments are finite).
Next, we prove Lemma 5.3, which states that ε-Hannan consistency is not substantially affected by additional
exploration.
Lemma 5.3. For ε ≥ 0, let A be an ε-Hannan consistent algorithm.
(i) For any γ > 0, Aγ is an (ε+ γ)-HC algorithm with guaranteed exploration.
(ii) A
√· is an ε-HC algorithm with guaranteed exploration.
19See the definition of thi and footnote 7.
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Proof. (i): The guaranteed exploration property of Aγ is trivial. Denoting by * the variables corresponding to the al-
gorithm Aγ we get
r∗(t) =
1
t
R∗(t)≤ 1
t
(1 · tex+R(t− tex))
=
tex
t
+
R(t− tex)
t− tex ·
t− tex
t
,
where, for given t ∈ N, tex denotes the number of times Aγ explored up to t-th iteration. By the strong law of large
numbers we have that lim
t→∞ tex/t = γ holds almost surely. This implies
limsup
t→∞
r∗ (t) ≤ limsup
t→∞
tex
t
+ limsup
t−tex→∞
R(t− tex)
t− tex · limsupt→∞
t− tex
t
≤ γ+ ε (1− γ)
≤ γ+ ε,
which means that Aγ is (ε+ γ)-Hannan consistent.
(ii): The guaranteed exploration follows from the fact that if the second player also uses A
√·, the probability that
both players explore at once is at least 1√t · 1√t = 1t . Since ∑ 1t =∞, this will happen infinitely many times, so each joint
action will be sampled infinitely many times. The proof of ε-Hannan consistency is similar to (i) and we omit it.
B The counterexample for Theorem 5.12
We first present some details related to the UPO property, and then proceed to give a proof of Lemma B.5 from
Section 4.2.2.
B.1 Examples and a sufficient condition for the UPO property
We present a few examples which are related to the UPO property and support the discussion that follows. We first
give the negative examples, and then continue with the positive ones.
Example B.1 (Examples related to the UPO property).
(i) Application to Section 4.2.1: Assume that (x(n))∞n=1 = (1,0,1,0,1, ...) and (w(n))
∞
n=1 = (1,3,1,3,1, ...). Then we
have x¯(n)→ 12 , but x˜(n)→ 14 .
(ii) In Section 4 we constructed a HC algorithm which produces a pattern nearly identical to (i) and leads to
limsup
n→∞
|x¯h0i j (n)− x˜h0i j (n)| ≥ 14 (in a certain game).
(iii) Suppose that w(n), x(n), n ∈N do not necessarily originate from SM-MCTS, but assume they satisfy (a) and (b):
(a) w(n) ∈ [0,C] and x(n) ∈ [0,1] are independent random variables.
(b) x(n) have expectations approximately constant over n ∈ N:
∃v ∈ [0,1]∀n ∈ N : E[x(n)] ∈
[
v− ε
2
,v+
ε
2
]
. (B.1)
Then, by strong law of large numbers, we almost surely have
limsup
n→∞
|x¯(n)− v| ≤ ε
2
and limsup
n→∞
|x˜(n)− v| ≤ ε
2
,
which leads to
limsup
n→∞
|x¯(n)− x˜(n)| ≤ ε. (B.2)
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(iv) The previous case can be generalized in many ways – for example it is sufficient to replace bounded weights w(n)
by ones satisfying
∃q ∈ (0,1) ∀n ∀i, j : Pr[w(n)≥ k]≤ qk
(an assumption which holds with q = γ/ |A1(h)| when w(n), x(n) originate from SM-MCTS with fixed explo-
ration). Note that the weights still need to be sufficiently independent, to avoid the pathological behavior from
Section 4.
(v) In Section 7 we provide empirical evidence which suggests that when the variables x(n), w(n) originate from
SM-MCTS with Exp3 or RM selection policy, then the assertion (B.2) holds as well (and thus these two ε-HC
algorithms are likely ε-UPO).
Parts (i) and (ii) from Example B.1 show that the implication (A is ε-HC =⇒ A is Cε-UPO) does not hold, no
matter how huge is the constant C > 0. On the other hand, (iii) and (iv) suggest that it is possible to prove that specific
ε-HC algorithms are ε-UPO. However, the guarantees we have about the behavior of, for example, Exp3 are much
weaker than the assumptions made in (iii) – there is no independence between wi j(n),xi j(m), m,n ∈ N, at best we
can use some martingale theory. Moreover, even in nodes h ∈H with dh = 1, we only have limsup
n→∞
|x¯i j(n)− vhi j| ≤ ε ,
instead of assumption (B.1) from (iii) (b).
The observations above suggest that the proof that specific ε-HC algorithms are ε-UPO will not be trivial. However,
we can at least state a sufficient condition for an algorithm to be ε-UPO, which is not dependent on the tree structure
of simultaneous-move games.
Remark B.2 (Sufficient condition for ε-UPO). Let A be a bandit algorithm, K,L ∈ N and for each i ≤ K, j ≤ L, let
(xi j(n))∞n=1 be an arbitrary sequence in [0,1]. Assume that player 1 uses A to choose actions i ∈ {1, ...,K} and player
2 uses a different instance of A to choose actions j ∈ {1, ....,L}, where the reward for playing actions (i, j) at time t is
xi j(ti j) (resp. 1− xi j(ti j) for player 2). As before, denote
x¯i j (n) :=
1
t
n
∑
m=1
xi j (m) ,
wi j (m) :=
∣∣{t ∈ N| ti j = m & j(t) = j}∣∣ ,
x˜i j (n) :=
1
∑nm=1 wi j (m)
n
∑
m=1
wi j (m)xi j (m) .
Clearly, if
∀i≤ K ∀ j ≤ L : limsup
n→∞
|x¯i j(n)− x˜i j(n)| ≤ ε a.s.
holds for all such sequences (xi j(n))∞n=1, then A is ε-UPO.
This condition should be easier to verify in practice than the original ε-UPO definition. On the other hand, the quan-
tification over all possible sequences (xi j(n))∞n=1 might be a too strong requirement. Moreover, it would be even better
to have an equivalent – or at least sufficient, yet not too strong – condition for an algorithm to be ε-UPO which only
operates with one player.
B.2 Details related to the counterexample for Theorem 5.12
In Section 4 (Lemma 4.2) we postulated the existence of algorithms, which behave similarly to those from Section 4.2.1,
but unlike those from Section 4.2.1, the new algorithms are ε-HC:
Lemma 4.2. Let G be the game from Figure 2. Then for each ε > 0 there exist ε-HC algorithms AI , AJ1, A
J
2, such
that when these algorithms are used for SM-MCTS in G, the resulting average strategy σ¯ (t) converges to σ¯ , where
σ¯ I = σ¯ J1 = σ¯
I
2 =
( 1
2 ,
1
2
)
.
First, we define these algorithms, and then we prove their properties in Lemma B.5. Lemma 4.2, then follows
directly from Lemma B.5.
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Remark B.3. The intention behind the notation which follows is that ch denotes how many times the other player
“cheated”, while c¯h is the average ratio of cheating in following the cooperation pattern. The variables c˜h and ˜¯ch then
serve as estimates of ch and c¯h. We present the precise definitions below. The nodes I, J, actions X, Y, L, R, U and D
and the respective payoffs refer to the game G from Figure 2.
Definition of the algorithm AJ1:
Fix an increasing sequence of integers bn and repeat for n ∈ N:
1. Buffer building Bn: Play according to some ε-HC algorithm for bn iterations (continuing with where we left of
in the (n−1)-th buffer building phase).
2. Cooperation Cn: Repeat U,U,D,D for t = 1,2, ... and expect the other player to repeat L,R,R,L. At each
iteration t, with probability ε , check whether the other player is cooperating – that is play the opposite of the
pattern-prescribed action and if the payoff does not correspond to the expected pattern the second player should
be following, set c˜h(t) = 1ε . If the other player passes this check, or if we did not perform it, set c˜h(t) = 0.
3. End of cooperation (might not happen): While executing step 2, denote ˜¯ch(t) := 1t ∑
t
s=1 c˜h(s). Once t satisfies
ε · bn
bn+ t
+1 · t
bn+ t
≥ 2ε, (B.3)
we check at each iteration whether the estimate ˜¯ch(t) threatens to exceed 2ε during the next iteration or not. If
it does, we end the cooperation phase, set n := n+1 and continue by the next buffer building phase.
4. Simulation of the other player: While repeating steps 1, 2 and 3, we simulate the other player’s algorithm AJ2
(this is possible since from the knowledge of our action and the received payoff we can recover the adversary’s
action). If it ends the cooperation phase and starts the next buffer building phase, we do the same.
5. Unless the cooperation phase is terminated, we stay in phase Cn indefinitely.
Definition of AJ2: The algorithm A
J
2 is identical to A
J
1, except for the fact that it repeats the pattern U, D, D, U instead
of L, R, R, L and expects the other player to repeat L, R, R, L.
Definition of AI: The algorithm AI is a straightforward modification of AJ1 (replacing 2ε and epsilon by 2ε and 3ε
in Eq. (B.3)) – it repeats the sequence Y, X, X, Y and expects to receive payoffs 0, 0, 0, ... whenever playing X and
payoffs 1, 0, 1, 0, ... when playing Y . However, whenever it deviates from the Y, X, X, Y pattern to check whether
these expectations are met, it plays the same action once again (to avoid disturbing the payoff pattern for Y ).
Remark B.4. The steps 2 and 3 from the algorithm description are correctly defined because the opponent’s action
choice can be recovered from the knowledge of our action choice and the resulting payoff. Regarding step 3, we note
that the condition here is trivially satisfied for t = 1, ...,εbn, so the length tn of the cooperation phases Cn tends to
infinity as n→ ∞, regardless of the opponent’s actions.
Lemma B.5. (1) When facing each other, the average strategies of algorithms AI , AJ1 and A
J
2 will converge to the sub-
optimal strategy σ I = σ J1 = σ
I
2 =
( 1
2 ,
1
2
)
. However the algorithms will suffer regret no higher than Cε for some C > 0
(where C is independent of ε).
(2) There exists a sequence bn (controlling the length of phases Bn), such that when facing a different adversary,
the algorithms suffer regret at most Cε . Consequently AI , AJ1 and A
J
2 are Cε-Hannan consistent.
Proof. Part (1): Note that, disregarding the checks made by the algorithms, the average strategies in cooperation
phases converge to
( 1
2 ,
1
2
)
. Furthermore, the probability of making the checks is the same, regardless on which action
is supposed to be played next. Therefore if the algorithms eventually settle in cooperative phase, the average strategies
converge to
( 1
2 ,
1
2
)
.
Step (i): The conclusion of (2) holds for AJp, p = 1,2.
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We claim that both algorithms AJp, p= 1,2 will eventually settle in the cooperative mode, thus generating the payoff
sequence 1,0,1,0 during at least (1− ε)2-fraction of the iterations and generating something else at the remaining
1− (1− ε)2 < 2ε iterations. It is then immediate that the algorithms AJp suffer regret at most 2ε (since as observed in
Section 4.2.1, the undisturbed pattern produces no regret).
Proof of (i): If the other player uses the same algorithm, we have E
[
c˜h(t)
]
= ε and Var
[
c˜h(t)
] ≤ 1ε < ∞, thus by
the Strong Law of Large Numbers ˜¯ch(t)−→ ε holds almost surely. In particular, there exists t0 ∈ N such that
Pr
[
∀t ≥ t0 : ˜¯ch(t)≤ 2ε
]
> 0.
In Remark B.4 we observed that the cooperative phase always lasts at least εbn steps. Therefore once we have bn ≥ 1ε t0,
there is non-zero probability both players will stay in n-th cooperative phase forever. If they do not, they have the same
positive probability of staying in the next cooperative phase and so on – by Borel-Cantelli lemma, they will almost
surely stay in Cn0 for some n0 ∈ N.
Step (ii): AI will eventually settle in the cooperative mode.
Proof of (ii): This statement can be proven by a similar argument as (i). The only difference is that instead of checking
whether the other player is cheating, we check whether the payoff sequence is the one expected by AI . The fact that AI
settles in cooperative mode then immediately implies that AI will repeat the Y, X, X, Y pattern during approximately
a (1−2ε)-fraction of the iterations (we check with probability ε , and we always check twice). It is then also immediate
that AI will receive the expected payoffs during at least (1− ε)-fraction of the iterations. (The payoff is always 0, as
expected, when X is played, and it is correct in at least 1− 2ε cases when playing Y . X and Y are both played with
same frequency, which gives the result.)
Step (iii) : If AJp, p = 1,2 and AI settle in cooperative mode, then AI suffers regret at most Cε .
Proof of (iii): Recall the definition (3.6) of xhi (t), definition of thi which follows it, and the notation introduced in
(5.6). We denote by i(t) := iI(t) the t-th action chosen by AI and by (i∗(s))s the 4-periodic of sequence of “ideal case
actions” starting with Y, X, X, Y. Recall that xJ (n) is the payoff obtained during the n-th visit of J and xIY (t) = x
J(tY ) is
the payoff we would receive for playing Y in I at time t (and xIX (t) = 0 is always zero). Finally we denote by (x
∗
Y (s))s
the 4-periodic of sequence of “ideal case payoffs” starting with 1, 0, 0, 0. Our goal is to show that the average regret
rI (t) =
1
t
(
t
∑
s=1
xIY (s)−
t
∑
s=1
xIi(s) (s)
)
is small. As we already observed in Section 4.2.1, if neither the payoff pattern (X∗Y (s))s = (1,0,1,0, ...) coming from J,
nor the action pattern (i∗(s))s = (Y,X ,X ,Y, ...) at I are disturbed, then we have (i(s)) = (i∗(s)) and
(
xIY (s)
)
= (x∗Y (s)),
and therefore AI suffers no regret. As long as the algorithms stay in the cooperative mode, the only way the pattern
can be disturbed is when the random checks occur. The checks at J occur with probability ε for each player, which
increases the average asymptotic regret by no more than 2ε (these checks will actually cancel out in expectation, but
we ignore this). Moreover, the combination of the 2-periodicity of the reward-pattern at J and the fact that AI checks
twice in a row guarantees that any check performed at I only affects 2 the two iterations during which it occurs. In the
worst case, this increases the average asymptotic regret by no more than 2ε . Hence the total average regret is at most
4ε in the limit.
Part (2): Algorithms AJp, p = 1,2, and AI are Cε-HC.
a) Firstly, we assume that both players stick to their assigned patterns during at least (1−2ε)-fraction of iterations (in
other words, assume that limsup c¯h(t) ≤ 2ε). By the same argument as in (1), we can show that the algorithms will
then suffer regret at most Cε .
b) On the other hand, if limsup c¯h(t) > 2ε , the algorithm will almost surely keep switching between Bn and Cn
(consequence of Strong Law of Large Numbers). Denote by rb,n and rc,n the regret from phases Bn and Cn, recall that
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bn, tn are the lengths of these phases and set
rn :=
bn
bn+ tn
rb,n+
tn
bn+ tn
rc,n = overall regret in Bn and Cn together.
Finally, let r = limsup rJ (t) denote the bound on the limit of regret of AJp. We need to prove that r ≤Cε . To do this, it
is sufficient to show that limsupn rn is small – thus our goal will be to prove that if the sequence bn increases quickly
enough, then limsup rn ≤Cε holds almost surely. Denote by (Fn) the formula
∀t ≥ 1
ε
bn : ˜¯ch(t)≤ 2ε =⇒ c¯h(t)≤ 3ε.
We know that
∣∣∣ ˜¯ch− c¯h∣∣∣→ 0 a.s., therefore we can choose bn such that
Pr [(Fn) holds]≥ 1−2−n
holds. Since ∑2−n < ∞, Borel-Cantelli lemma gives that (Fn) will hold for all but finitely many n ∈ N. Note that if
(Fn) holds for both players, then their empirical strategy is at most 3ε away from the NE strategy, and thus rc,n ≤Cε .
Since rn is a convex combination of rb,n and rc,n and in Bn we play ε-consistently, we can compute
r ≤ limsup rn ≤max
{
limsup rb,n, limsup rc,n
}≤max{ε,Cε}=Cε.
The proof of Cε-Hannan consistency of AI is analogous.
C Proofs related to the convergence of SM-MCTS(-A)
C.1 Convergence of SM-MCTS-A
In this section, we give the proofs for lemmas which were used to prove Theorem 5.4. We begin with Lemma 5.7,
which established a connection between average payoff g and game value v for matrix games.
Lemma 5.7. Let ε ≥ 0 be a real number. If both players in a matrix game M are ε-Hannan consistent, then the
following inequalities hold almost surely:
vM− ε ≤ liminf
t→∞ g
M(t)≤ limsup
t→∞
gM(t)≤ vM + ε, (5.1)
vM−2ε ≤ liminf
t→∞ u
M
1 (σˆ1(t),br) & limsup
t→∞
uM1 (br, σˆ2(t))≤ vM +2ε. (5.2)
Proof. It is our goal to draw conclusion about the quality of the empirical strategy based on information about the per-
formance of our ε-HC algorithm. Ideally, we would like to relate the utility uM1 (σˆ) to the average payoff g
M(t).
However, as this is generally impossible, we can do the next best thing:
uM1 (br, σˆ2(t)) = maxi ∑j
σˆ2(t)( j)vMi j = maxi ∑j
t j
t
vMi j =
1
t
max
i
∑
j
t jvMi j
=
1
t
max
i
t
∑
s=1
vMi j(s) =
1
t
Gmax(t) = gmax(t).
Step 1: Let η > 0. Using the ε-HC property gives us the existence of such t0 that gMmax(t)− gM(t) < ε + η2 holds
for all t ≥ t0, which is equivalent to gM(t) > gMmax− (ε + η2 ). However, in our zero-sum matrix game setting, gMmax
is always at least vM , which implies that gM(t) > vM − (ε + η2 ). Using the same argument for player 2 gives us that
gM(t)< vM + ε+ η2 . Therefore we have the following statement, which proves the inequalities (5.1):
∀t ≥ t0 : vM− (ε+ η2 )< g
M(t)< vM + ε+
η
2
holds almost surely.
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Step 2: We assume, for contradiction with inequalities (5.2), that with non-zero probability, there exists an in-
creasing sequence of time steps tn↗ ∞, such that uM1 (br, σˆ2(tn)) ≥ vM + 2ε +η for some η > 0. Combing this with
the inequalities we proved above, we see that
limsup
t→∞
rM (t) ≥ limsup
n→∞
rM (tn) = limsup
n→∞
(
gMmax (tn)−gM (tn)
)
= limsup
n→∞
(
uM1 (br, σˆ2 (tn))−gM (tn)
)
≥ vM +2ε+η− (vM + ε+η/2)= ε+η > ε
holds with non-zero probability, which is in contradiction with ε-Hannan consistency.
Proposition 5.9. Let c,ε > 0 and let (M˜) be a repeated matrix game with cε-bounded distortion, played by two ε-HC
players. Then the following inequalities hold almost surely:
vM− (c+1)ε ≤ liminf
t→∞ g
M˜(t)≤ limsup
t→∞
gM˜(t)≤ vM +(c+1)ε, (5.3)
vM−2(c+1)ε ≤ liminf
t→∞ u
M
1 (σˆ1,br)≤ limsup
t→∞
uM1 (br, σˆ2)≤ vM +2(c+1)ε. (5.4)
Remark C.1. In the following proof, and in the proof of Proposition 5.13, we will be working with regrets, average
payoffs and other quantities related to matrix games with bounded distortion, in which we have two sets of rewards –
the “precise” rewards vMi j corresponding to the matrix M and the “distorted” rewards v
M˜
i j (t). We denote the variables
related to the distorted rewards vM˜i j (t) with the superscript ‘M˜’ (for example g
M˜
max(t) = maxi
1
t ∑
t
s=1 v
M˜
i j(s)(s)) and use
the superscript ‘M‘ for variables related to vMi j (for example g
M
max(t) = maxi
1
t ∑
t
s=1 v
M
i j(s)).
Proof of Proposition 5.9. This proposition strengthens the result of Lemma 5.7 and its proof will also be similar.
The only additional technical ingredient is the inequality (C.1).
Since (M˜) is a repeated game with cε-bounded distortion, there almost surely exists t0, such that for all t ≥ t0,∣∣∣vM˜i j (t)− vMi j ∣∣∣≤ cε holds. This leads to
∣∣∣gM˜max(t)−gMmax(t)∣∣∣≤maxi
∣∣∣∣∣1t t∑s=1
(
vM˜i j(s)(s)− vMi j(s)
)∣∣∣∣∣≤ t0t + cε · t− t0t t→∞−→ cε. (C.1)
The remainder of the proof contains no new ideas, and it is nearly exactly the same as the proof of Lemma 5.7, therefore
we just note what the two main steps are:
Step 1: Hannan consistency gives us that
∀η > 0 ∃t0 ∈ N ∀t ≥ t0 : gM˜ (t)≥ vM− (ε+η)−
∣∣∣gM˜max (t)−gMmax (t)∣∣∣ holds a.s.,
from which we deduce the inequalities
vM− (ε+ cε)≤ liminf
t→∞ g
M˜(t)≤ limsup
t→∞
gM˜(t)≤ vM + ε+ cε.
Step 2: For contradiction we assume that there exists an increasing sequence of time steps tn↗ ∞, such that
uM1 (br, σˆ2(tn))≥ vM +2(c+1)ε+η (C.2)
holds for some η > 0. Using the identity gMmax (tn) = uM1 (br, σˆ2(tn)) and inequalities (C.1) and (C.2), we then compute
that the regret rM˜(tn) is too high, which completes the proof:
ε ≥ limsup
t→∞
rM˜ (t)≥ limsup
n→∞
rM˜ (tn) = limsup
n→∞
(
gM˜max (tn)−gM˜ (tn)
)
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= limsup
n→∞
(
gMmax (tn)−
(
gMmax (tn)−gM˜max (tn)
)
−gM˜ (tn)
)
≥ limsup
n→∞
uM1 (br, σˆ2(tn))− limsup
n→∞
∣∣∣gMmax(tn)−gM˜max(tn)∣∣∣− limsup
n→∞
gM˜(tn)
(C.1),(C.2)
≥ (vM +2(c+1)ε+η)− cε− (vM + ε+ cε)
= ε+η > ε.
C.2 Convergence of SM-MCTS
In Section 5.2, we stated Theorem 5.12 which claimed that if a SM-MCTS algorithm uses a selection function which
is both ε-UPO and ε-HC, it will find an approximate equilibrium. To finish the proof of Theorem 5.12, it remains
to prove Proposition 5.13, which establishes a connection between regrets Rh and RMh of the selection function with
respect to rewards xhi (t) , resp. w.r.t. the matrix game Mh = (v
h
i j)i j. The goal is to show that if R
h(T ) is small and
algorithm A is ε-UPO, then the regret RMh(T ) is small as well.
Proposition 5.13. For ε,c≥ 0 let an algorithm A be ε-HC and h ∈H . If A is ε-UPO and limsup
n→∞
∣∣∣x¯hi j (n)− vhi j∣∣∣≤ cε
holds a.s. for each i, j, then
limsup
t→∞
1
t
(
max
i
t
∑
s=1
vhi j(s)−
t
∑
s=1
vhi(s) j(s)
)
≤ 2(c+1)ε holds a.s.. (5.8)
In particular, the regret rMh(t) of A with respect to the matrix game Mh =
(
vhi j
)
i j
satisfies
limsup
t→∞
rMh(t)≤ 2(c+1)ε.
Proof. Let ε , c, A and h be as in the proposition. Since in this proof we will only deal with actions taken in h, we
will temporarily omit the upper index ‘h’ in variables thi , t
h
j , t
h
i j, i
h(t) and jh(t). As in Remark C.1, RMh is the regret of
player 1 with respect to the matrix game Mh =
(
vhi j
)
i j
:
RMh (T ) = max
i∗
T
∑
t=1
vhi∗ j(t)−
T
∑
t=1
vhi(t) j(t) =: maxi∗
SMhi∗ (T ).
Recall that by (3.7), we have xhi (t) = x
h
i j(t)
(
ti j(t)
)
. This allows us to rewrite the regret RM˜h = Rh that player 1 is
attempting to minimize:
Rh (T ) def.= max
i∗
T
∑
t=1
xhi∗ (t)−
T
∑
t=1
xh(t)
(3.7)
= max
i∗
T
∑
t=1
xhi∗ j(t)
(
ti∗ j(t)
)− T∑
t=1
xhi(t) j(t)
(
ti(t) j(t)
)
=:max
i∗
Shi∗(T ).
Since A is ε-HC, we have limsupT Rh (T )/T ≤ ε a.s. and our goal infer that limsupT RMh (T )/T ≤ 2 (c+1)ε holds
a.s. as well. Let i∗ be an action of player 1. Note the following two facts:
Tj =
Ti∗ j
∑
m=1
whi∗ j (m) ...by definition of w
h
i j (n), (a)
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(
j(t) = j & ti∗ j(t) = m
)
=⇒ xhi∗ j(t)(ti∗ j(t)) = xhi∗ j(m) ...by (3.7) (b)
We can rewrite Shi∗ (T ) as follows:
Shi∗ (T ) =
T
∑
t=1
xhi∗ j(t)
(
ti∗ j(t)
)− T∑
t=1
xhi(t) j(t)
(
ti(t) j(t)
)
(b)
=∑
j
Ti∗ j
∑
m=1
xhi∗ j (m)
∣∣{t ≤ T | ti∗ j(t) = m& j(t) = j}∣∣−∑
i, j
Ti j
∑
m=1
xhi j (m)
(a)
=∑
j
Tj
∑
Ti∗ j
m=1 wi∗ j (m)
Ti∗ j
∑
m=1
xhi∗ j (m)∗wi j (m)−∑
i, j
Ti j
Ti j
Ti j
∑
m=1
xhi j (m)
=∑
j
Tj x˜hi∗ j (Ti∗ j)−∑
i, j
Ti j x¯hi j (Ti j)
=∑
j
Tj
(
vhi∗ j + x˜
h
i∗ j (Ti∗ j)− vhi∗ j
)
−∑
i, j
Ti j
(
vhi j + x¯
h
i j (Ti j)− vhi j
)
=:∑
j
Tj
∑
m=1
vhi∗ j−∑
i, j
Ti j
∑
m=1
vhi j +X
h
i∗ (T )
=
T
∑
t=1
vhi∗ j(t)−
T
∑
t=1
vhi(t) j(t)+X
h
i∗ (T ) ,
=SMhi∗ (T )+Xi∗ (T )
where
Xhi∗ (T ) :=∑
j
Tj
(
x˜hi∗ j (Ti∗ j)− vhi∗ j
)
−∑
i, j
Ti j
(
s¯hi j (Ti j)− vhi j
)
.
In particular, we can bind the regret Rh(T ) as
RMh = max
i∗
SMhi∗ (T ) = maxi∗
(
Shi∗(T )−Xhi∗(T )
)
≤ Rh(T )+max
i∗
∣∣∣Xhi∗(T )∣∣∣ .
Clearly Xhi∗ (T ) satisfies ∣∣∣∣Xhi∗ (T )T
∣∣∣∣≤∑
j
Tj
T
∣∣∣x˜hi∗ j (Ti∗ j)− vhi∗ j∣∣∣+∑
i, j
Ti j
T
∣∣∣x¯hi j (Ti j)− vhi j∣∣∣ .
Using the ε-UPO property and the assumption that limsupn
∣∣∣x¯hi j (n)− vhi j∣∣∣≤ cε holds a.s. for each i, j, we get
limsup
T→∞
∣∣∣∣Xhi∗ (T )T
∣∣∣∣≤ limsup
T→∞
∑
j
Tj
T
∣∣∣x˜hi∗ j (Ti∗ j)− vhi∗ j∣∣∣+
+ ∑
i, j
Ti j
T
∣∣∣x¯hi j (Ti j)− vhi j∣∣∣
≤ (c+1)ε limsup
T→∞
∑
j
Tj
T
+
+ cε limsup
T→∞
∑
i, j
Ti j
T
= (2c+1)ε.
Consequently, this implies that
limsup
T→∞
RMh (T )/T ≤ limsup
T→∞
Rh (T )/T + limsup
T→∞
max
i∗
Xhi∗ (T )/T
≤ ε+(2c+1)ε = 2(c+1)ε
42
holds almost surely, which is what we wanted to prove.
D The proof of Proposition 6.2
Proposition 6.2. Let M be a matrix game, A a HC algorithm, γ > 0, and Aγ the “γ-exploration modification” of A
from Definition 5.2. Let σ¯(t) be the average strategy obtained if both players use Aγ in M, and let µ¯(t) be as in (6.3).
Then for each p we have
(i) limsupt explp(σ¯p(t))≤ 2γ ,
(ii) limsupt explp(µ¯p(t))≤ γ .
Sketch. By Lemma 3.1, it suffices to prove the result for the empirical frequencies σˆ(t) and µˆ(t). By definition of
exploitability, the first case follows from (5.2) in Lemma 5.7 (using ε = 0). Since the proof of the second case is similar
to that of (5.2) in Lemma 5.7, we only give the main ideas. We focus on bounding the second player’s exploitability.
The first ingredient is that uM1 (br, µˆ2(t)) is equal to g
M,A
max(t), the analogy of gMmax(t) where we only consider the iter-
ations where the second player didn’t explore. Secondly, using the γ-Hannan-consistency of player 1’s Aγ , we bound
the asymptotic difference between gMmax(t) and g
M(t). Since the second player explores independently of first player’s
algorithm, the same bound holds for gM,Amax(t) and gM,A(t). Thirdly, the Hannan-consistency of player 2’s A implies that
gM,A(t)≥ vM holds in the limit.
Finally, we combine these observations and show that if the exploitability of µˆ2(t) was higher than γ in the limit –
that is, if uM1 (br, µˆ2(t)) was higher than v
M + γ – then the regret gM,Amax(t)−gM,A(t) = uM1 (br, µˆ2(t))−gM,A(t) of player
1 would be higher than γ .
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SM-MCTS-A(h – current state of the game)
1: if h ∈Z then // current state is terminal
2: return (u1(h),u1(h))
3: if h ∈ T then // current state is in memory
4: (i, j)← Select(h) // generate actions
5: th← th+1 // increase visit counter
6: (x,x)← SM-MCTS(hi j) // get the latest and average reward
7: Update(h, i, j,x) // update by the average reward
8: Gh← Gh+ x // update cumulative reward
9: return (x,Gh/th) // return reward & current state average reward
10: else // state is not in memory
11: T← T∪{h} // add state to memory
12: th, Gh ← 0 // initialize visit counter and cumulative reward
13: x← Rollout(h) // finish the game randomly
14: return (x,x)
Alg. 2: SM-MCTS-A, a variant of SM-MCTS which is guaranteed to converge to an equilibrium (under the assump-
tions of Theorem 5.4).
Input: K - number of actions; γ - exploration parameter
1: ∀i : Gi← 0 // initialize cumulative sum estimates
2: for t← 1,2, . . . do // in each iteration
3: ∀i : µi← exp(
γ
K Gi)
∑Kj=1 exp(
γ
K G j)
// compute the new strategy
4: ∀i : µ ′i ← (1− γ)µi+ γK // add uniform exploration
5: Sample action i(t) from distribution µ ′ and receive reward r
6: Gi(t)← Gi(t)+ r/µ ′i(t) // update the cumulative sum estimates
Alg. 3: Exponential-weight algorithm for Exploration and Exploitation (Exp3) algorithm for regret minimization in
adversarial bandit setting
Input: K - number of actions; γ - the amount of exploration
1: ∀i : Ri← 0 // initialize regret estimates
2: for t← 1,2, . . . do // in each iteration
3: ∀i : R+i ←max{0,Ri}
4: if ∑Kj=1 R
+
j = 0 then // all regrets are non-positive
5: ∀i : µi← 1/K // use uniform strategy
6: else // otherwise, update the strategy based on regrets
7: ∀i : µi← (1− γ) R
+
i
∑Kj=1 R
+
j
+ γK
8: Sample action i(t) from distribution µ and receive reward r
9: ∀i : Ri← Ri− r // update regrets
10: Ri(t)← Ri(t)+ r/µi(t)
Alg. 4: Regret matching variant for regret minimization in adversarial bandit setting.
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